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Many of the symptoms characteristic of PTSD such as hypervigiliance towards 
threat, involve attentional processes. The first part of this thesis explored the role of 
attentional processes in the maintenance and treatment of PTSD. Although general models 
of anxiety give attentional processes central prominence cognitive models of PTSD (e.g., 
Foa & Riggs, 1993; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) assign an 
important role to trauma memory and place little or no emphasis on the role of attentional 
processes in maintaining symptoms. Models of anxiety have suggested that attentional bias 
is automatic (Mathews & Macleod, 2002) or strategic (Wells & Mathews, 1994). Wells‟ 
(2000) Metacognitive Model of PTSD is one of the few models to emphasis thinking style 
and attention rather then memory. In this model attentional bias is thought to be strategic in 
nature. The evidence reviewed supports a role of attention in PTSD and suggests it may be 
beneficial to modify this process. Two different attention techniques based on models of 
bias are reviewed.  
 
The second part of the thesis described a randomized controlled evaluation of 
attentional training technique (ATT; Wells, 1990) on traumatic stress symptoms in a 
sample of 60 university students, who had previously experienced a stressful life event. 
ATT is a technique used in metacognitive therapy to modify the control of attention. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either an ATT group (n = 29) or a control group (n 
= 31). An emotional attention set shifting task was included as an objective measure of 
attention. The results supported the hypotheses, ATT reduced intrusions and negative 
affect, increased self-report attention flexibility and modified performance on the attention 
set shifting task. The results are consistent with the metacognitive model of PTSD. 
Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed and the results add to studies suggesting 
positive effects of the technique across a range of disorders.  
 
The third part critically reflected on methodological and ethical issues from the 
above research study. The interpretation of the findings is limited by the student 
population. It is acknowledged that the results are preliminary in nature but it is believed 
that the study provides useful insights into the role of attentional processes in the 
development and treatment of traumatic stress symptoms and provides a basis for studies 
in the future.  
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Abstract 
 
Some of the most prevalent symptoms of PTSD such as hypervigilance towards 
threatening stimuli, increased startle response and difficulty concentrating involve 
attentional processes. The presence of attentional bias in individuals with PTSD is well 
established in the literature. It has been demonstrated using a variety of experimental 
paradigms. There is debate as to whether this attentional bias represents an automatic or 
strategic stage of information processing. Despite the apparent importance of attention bias 
in anxiety it does not figure prominently in most cognitive models of PTSD. Instead 
cognitive models of PTSD assign a special role to memory processes. An exception is 
presented by the Metacognitive Model of PTSD (Wells, 2000), where attentional control is 
central in emotional disorder. Research examining the direct modification of attentional 
processes across a range of anxiety disorders is reviewed. These attentional training 
strategies may be beneficial in the treatment of traumatic stress symptoms and suggestions 
for future research are provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Attentional bias, PTSD, Metacognitive Therapy, attentional training 
 
Highlights: 
 
Evidence supports the presence of attentional bias in PTSD. 
 
Cognitive Models of PTSD assign an important role to memory but do not emphasize the 
role of attentional processes.  
 
 The Metacognitive Model of PTSD emphasizes the role of attentional control in 
maintaining disorder. 
 
Attention training strategies may be beneficial in the alleviation of stress symptoms. 
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Introduction 
 
Impaired attentional processes have been identified as one of the primary cognitive 
factors involved in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety (Eysenck, Derahshan, Santos, 
& Calvo, 2007). The concept of attentional bias (i.e. the selective allocation of attentional 
resources to threat related stimuli) plays a central role in most theories of anxiety disorders 
(Devineni, Blanchard, Hickling & Buckley, 2004). A meta-analysis of attentional bias 
towards threat, included 172 studies (across different stimuli, samples and cognitive tasks) 
and yielded a robust effect size (d = 0.45) (Bar-Heim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). Although effects of attentional bias are robust, their 
implications for understanding emotional disorders remain inconclusive (Matthews & 
Wells, 2000). 
 
PTSD is an anxiety-based disorder characterized by the allocation of attentional 
resources towards threatening stimuli (Harvey, Bryant & Rapee, 1996). Attentional bias 
assessed by the modified Stroop Task has been demonstrated for a number of clinical 
psychiatric conditions, but it is generally larger for PTSD than for any other disorder 
(Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). A substantial number of studies have 
demonstrated the presence of attentional bias in PTSD (e.g. Bryant & Harvey, 1995, Beck, 
Freeman, Shipherd, Hamblen & Lackner, 2001). This is not surprising considering that 
some of the most prevalent symptoms in PTSD such as hypervigilance towards threat, 
difficulty concentrating, and exaggerated startle response appear to be related to attentional 
processes. 
 
There is controversy in the literature in relation to how this attentional bias is 
measured and whether it reflects automatic or strategic stages of information processing 
(for a review see Cisler, Bacon & Williams, 2009).  Posner and Snyder (1975) described 
automatic processing as that occurring without conscious effort and it is capacity free (i.e., 
does not require the additional allocation of processing resources). Conversely strategic 
processing involves conscious-controlled effort and is capacity-limited in nature. A strict 
dichotomy between automatic and strategic processing is discouraged and automaticity is 
conceptualized as a continuum (Bargh, 1992). Researchers have argued that attentional 
processes studied in PTSD don‟t fall directly into either category as many of the symptoms 
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are involuntary but not necessarily capacity free. (Bryant & Harvey, 1997; Wells & 
Matthews, 1994).  
 
In this review cognitive models of attentional bias are described emphasizing 
different levels of control of attention: automatic (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) and 
strategic (Wells & Matthews, 1994). Following this a brief summary of cognitive tasks 
used to assess attentional bias is presented. An overview of PTSD is provided, cognitive 
models of PTSD are discussed and literature relating to the presence of attentional bias in 
PTSD is reviewed. The focus has been narrowed to include: (1) social cognitive theories 
(Horowitz, 1982, 1986; Janoff-Bulman, 1989, 1992), (2) emotional processing theory (Foa 
& Riggs, 1993), (3) the cognitive model of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000), (4) dual 
representation theory (Brewin, Dalgeish, & Joseph, 1996), and (5), the metacognitive 
model (Wells, 2000). Evidence of attentional bias in PTSD has been divided into automatic 
and strategic stages of processing. Finally theoretically based treatment techniques that aim 
to modify attentional processes are summarized. Their potential applicability in the 
treatment of PTSD is discussed. It is important to note that this review has excluded 
treatment techniques that are intended for use as stress management or coping strategies in 
response to stress symptoms or whose explicit goal is altering awareness in the here and 
now (e.g. distraction, attention refocusing, autogenic relaxation, mindfulness, meditation) 
as the goal of these techniques is to alter affect and cognition rather than attention directly.  
 
The review was limited to papers published in English and included review articles 
and empirical papers. No time constraints were imposed as an inclusion criterion. A 
number of methods were used to identify papers included in the review. Computerized 
searches were completed using „Your JOURNALS@ Ovid‟ and „PsychARTICLES Full 
Text‟ with combinations of key terms: attention, trauma, treatment, PTSD, traumatic stress 
symptoms, attentional processes, attentional control, attentional manipulations, attention 
training. Reference sections were manually searched from relevant articles and reviews. 
Finally additional literature was drawn on (e.g.  Library databases were searched for 
relevant books and publications) in order to comprehensively review the role of attentional 
processes in PTSD. 
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Theories of Attention Bias in Anxiety 
 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews (1988) described a processing stage 
model in which attention bias is viewed as automatic. This model maintains that the threat 
value of stimuli is determined at the automatic level by an affective decision mechanism 
(ADM). This system decides whether information is high or low in threat and the decision 
is influenced by trait anxiety. A resource allocation mechanism (RAM) is activated if 
stimuli are judged as threatening. When the RAM is activated, attentional resources will be 
allocated to threat. If stimuli are judged as non-threatening attention is focused at the task 
at hand and the new stimulus input is not attended to.  This attention bias is determined by 
automatic or “preconscious” processes. 
 
Consistent with Williams et al. (1998) Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) accounted 
for selective processing in anxiety via a „Threat Evaluation system‟ (TES). In this model 
the meanings of stimuli are processed in parallel and compete for attentional resources. 
Input from a TES strengthens activation of threat related stimuli, to an extent influenced by 
anxiety level. Such activation can be opposed by voluntary task related effort, and the 
balance between these two processes determines the extent of the attentional bias.  
 
Following from these models, Mathews and MacLeod (2002) propose that a certain 
information processing style (i.e. a preferential bias to process threat related stimuli) will 
expose the individual to a stream of information about possible dangers leading to 
increased anxiety. They maintain that for anxious individuals the level of threat sufficient 
to cause switching from an avoidant to a vigilant processing mode is low.  Vulnerable 
individuals respond in an „all or nothing‟ manner and are unable to disengage attention 
from threat related cues, no matter how irrelevant they are to current goals. McNally 
(1995) suggested that the automaticity hypothesis may have negative implications for 
treatment, as is it may not be possible to modify this bias. However, attentional bias 
modification treatment studies have emerged from the work of Mathews and MacLeod 
(2002) and shall be discussed in more depth later in this review. It is suggested that 
manipulating attentional biases can cause changes in vulnerability to anxiety. The main 
idea is that cognitive tasks used to measure attention bias can be modified to implicitly 
manipulate attentional bias and reduce anxiety. 
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Mathews and Macleod (2002) reviewed two studies in which high trait anxious 
students (n = 20) were matched for trait anxiety scores and randomly allocated to either an 
“avoid threat” condition or to a control condition (targets appeared equally at both neutral 
and threat locations).  They were trained over 8 sessions over a 3 week period for a total of 
6000- 7500 trials. Students reported significant reductions in trait anxiety from pre to post 
training. MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy & Holker (2002) showed that non-
anxious individuals could be trained to show bias towards threat. They trained individuals 
to either attend towards or away from threatening stimuli. They then exposed each group to 
a stressor task (an anagram) and the group that was trained to attend to threatening stimuli 
reported greater anxiety than the other group. They concluded anxiety results directly from 
the acquisition of attentional biases. According to this model it is the type of processing 
bias that is automatically elicited by events which causes vulnerability to anxiety, instead 
of biased processing being only a consequence of anxiety. This „model of automatic bias‟ 
can be contrasted with the „controlled model of bias‟ offered in the Self-Regulatory 
Executive Function Model (S-REF Model: Wells & Matthews, 1994)  
 
The S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 1994) argues that attentional bias is not 
simply a vulnerability factor for disorder caused by an automatic bias in processing threat 
stimuli. It is an outcome of the individual‟s strategies for coping with threat. This model 
proposes that attentional bias is strategic and that it persists due to a variety of thought 
control or behavior strategies employed by the individual. Perseverative styles of thinking 
such as worry and rumination should be reduced and attention should be manipulated so 
that self-focus is reduced and attention to disconfirmatory information is increased.  
 
Matthews and Wells (2000) reviewed literature related to the automaticity debate 
and concluded that the evidence for the presence of strategic processing of attentional bias 
towards threat is most convincing. They highlight a number of methodological issues in 
demonstrating automaticity such as the presentation intervals of stimuli in the masked 
Stroop task. Dagenbach, Carr, and Wilhelmson (1989) suggest that strategy may bias 
encoding processes without bringing the material encoded into consciousness. Wells and 
Matthews (1994a) summarize a number of experimental and simulation studies 
demonstrating strategy related bias such as evidence related to priming effects. Anxious 
individuals showed enhanced priming effects suggesting strategic rather than automatic 
processing (Richards & France, 1992; Richards, French, Johnson, Naparstek, & Williams, 
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1992). A distinction is also made between awareness and volition in highlighting how 
strategy dependent bias may operate. For instance once a person decides they should 
monitor for signs of threat, this decision may only interject into consciousness 
intermittently (Schneider, Dumais & Shiffrin, 1984). The S-REF model emphasizes the 
role of top-down processes and suggests that an increased understanding of how 
individuals allocate attention to threat and the control of attention is necessary for effective 
treatment of emotional disorders. 
 
Measuring Attentional Bias  
 
Cisler and Koster (2010) have divided attentional bias into three components: (1) 
facilitated attention (threat related stimuli are detected faster than neutral stimuli), (2) 
attentional disengagement (difficulty disengaging attention away from threatening stimuli) 
and (3) attentional avoidance (directing attention away from threatening locations). Most 
studies have used either facilitation or interference paradigms to test for attentional bias. 
Attentional biases have been observed using several different tasks which illustrates the 
generalisability of the phenomenon across measures of attentional performance.  
 
The Modified Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935) requires individuals to name different 
words (e.g., threatening or neutral) on a computer screen. Participants are asked to identify 
the colour, in which the words are printed while ignoring the meaning of the words. It is 
hypothesised that longer response times (RT‟s) to colour name threat words compared to 
neutral words are evidence of attentional bias (attentional interference). A variant called 
the masked Stroop task is used to assess automatic processing. The stimulus is presented 
very briefly to prevent conscious recognition and then replaced by a backward mask in the 
same colour as the original stimulus. Increased response times indicate that the attentional 
bias occurred prior to conscious recognition. However this effect may not be exemplary as 
most studies do not establish recognition thresholds on an individual basis (Wells & 
Matthews, 1994). The utility of the task in the field of PTSD has been questioned as 
successful treatment after motor vehicle accident (MVA) related PTSD did not result in a 
decrease in attentional bias (Devineni et al., 2002). MacLeod, et al., (1986) suggest that 
delay in response time may occur as a result of emotional arousal associated with the 
threatening stimuli. While the task does assess attentional control it may confound 
vigilance and avoidance and it does not account for the measurement of spatial location 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010).   
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The Dot Probe Task (MacLeod, et al., 1986) relies heavily on spatial orientation in 
attentional processes. It displays two words or pictures on a computer screen 
simultaneously, one at the top and one at the bottom or to the left and right. Following a 
brief stimulus presentation, the stimuli disappear and a probe appears in a location 
previously occupied by one of the stimuli. The participant is asked to press a button 
indicating whether the top or bottom stimulus has been replaced by a probe. It is 
hypothesized that faster response times toward probes that replace threatening stimuli 
compared to probes that replace neutral stimuli are thought to indicate an attentional bias. 
In addition, the dot probe also has the same limitation as the Stroop task in that a delayed 
RT may represent vigilance toward threat or a delayed disengagement (Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere & Houwer, 2004) 
 
The visual search task (e.g. Rinck, Becker, Kellerman, & Roth, 2001) also allows 
for the assessment of spatial attentional allocation. Participants are asked to identify a 
target stimulus that is embedded in a matrix of distracting stimuli.  For example, a target 
threatening word or picture might be displayed in a matrix of neutral words or pictures. Or 
a neutral target word or picture may be embedded in a matrix of threatening words or 
pictures. Attentional biases are inferred from faster response times to detect a threatening 
stimulus in a matrix of neutral stimuli relative to response times to detect neutral stimuli in 
neutral matrices.  
 
The emotional spatial cueing task (e.g. Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001) 
displays a single picture (e.g. an angry face) on a computer screen as a cue for a simple 
probe. This task also relies on spatial attentional control processes (Johnson, 2009). The 
probe may appear in the same location as the cue or on the opposite side of the screen. 
Individuals who take longer to disengage attention away from the location of an angry face 
cue when the probe appears in the opposite screen location are interpreted as having 
deployed a disproportionate amount of attention toward the angry face.  
 
The Attentional Control Capacity for Emotional Representations (ACCE) Task 
(Johnson, 2009) adapted the explicit cueing task paradigm to measure ability to shift 
attention towards and away from emotional mental sets. Evidence suggests that individuals 
who are more efficient at shifting attention between tasks or inhibiting previous mental sets 
exhibit lower levels of rumination (Whitmer & Banich, 2007). Each trial begins with a cue 
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presented on a computer screen. This cue is either a solid bar or a patterned bar that 
informs participants whether they need to make an emotional or neutral judgment. The cue 
is replaced with a stimulus (a face with a shape between the eyes) on which the participant 
has to make a judgment. A solid bar serves as a cue to the participant to attend and respond 
to the emotional expression of the face (emotional mental set), whereas a patterned bar 
cues the participant to attend and respond to the type of shape between the eyes of the face 
(neutral mental set).For the emotional judgment they are asked to identify if the valance of 
the face is happy, angry or neutral. For the neutral judgment they are asked to identify the 
type of shape located between the eyes of the face, which could be a circle, square or 
triangle.  Effective emotional attentional control is measured by „switch cost‟, the time 
taken to switch between tasks. Possible advantages of the ACCE task are that it allows one 
to look at attentional engagement and disengagement from positive and negative stimuli in 
the domain of attentional control. This is important because theories of thought control 
difficulties (e.g. S-REF model; Wells & Mathews, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) posit 
inflexibility in attentional control as a factor in the development of intrusive thoughts and 
negative affect such as that seen in PTSD.  
 
Overview of PTSD 
 
A formal diagnosis of PTSD requires that the individual has been exposed to a 
traumatic event (Criterion A) that involves actual or threatened death or injury, and that 
their response consists of intense fear, helplessness, or horror (DSM-IV-TR; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Symptom clusters include: (1) re-experiencing the 
traumatic event (Criterion B), (2) persistent avoidance (Criterion C) and (3) symptoms of 
increased arousal (Criterion D). The duration of symptoms must be at least one month 
(Criterion E) and the disturbance must cause significant impairment of functioning 
(Criterion E).  
 
PTSD shares a number of clinical features with other emotional disorders and it is 
rarely diagnosed in isolation (Davidson & Foa, 1991). It has been estimated that 80% of 
PTSD sufferers receive an additional diagnosis (McFarlane, 1992). Sufferers from PTSD 
have a greater number of medical conditions than people without PTSD (Ouimette, 
Cronkite, Henson, Orins, Gima, et al., 2004), including somatisation, chronic pain and poor 
health (Schnurr & Green, 2003).  
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Although research suggests that 50-60% of people will experience a traumatic 
event (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995) only a minority go on to 
develop PTSD. The risk of developing PTSD after a traumatic event is 8.1% for men and 
20.4% for women (Kessler et al., 1995). For younger urban populations an overall higher 
risk of 23.6% has been reported (Breslau, Davis, Andreski, & Peterson, 1991). Whilst 
many individuals report traumatic stress symptoms (e.g. intrusive thoughts) shortly after a 
trauma these symptoms usually subside without intervention (Rothbaum, Foa, Riggs, 
Murdock, & Walsh, 1992). However at least one third of individuals who initially develop 
PTSD remain symptomatic for 3 years or longer and are at risk of secondary problems 
such as substance misuse (Kessler et al., 1995).  
 
Clinical researchers have attempted to identify what makes some individuals more 
vulnerable to developing PTSD. Buckley, Blanchard and Neill (2000) suggest that pre-
trauma measures of intelligence (IQ) are predictive of the development of PTSD 
symptoms. One meta-analysis (Ozner, Lipsy & Weiss, 2003) identified 7 predictors of 
PTSD which yielded significant effect sizes: (1) previous trauma, (2) prior psychological 
adjustment (3) family history of psychopathology, (4) perceived life threat during trauma 
(5) post trauma social support (6) emotional responses at the time of the trauma and (7) 
dissociation during and immediately after the trauma. Prior characteristics such as previous 
trauma, family history and prior adjustment yielded the smallest effect size (weighted r = 
0.17) and dissociation the largest (weighted r = 0.35).  The authors suggest the mechanism 
by which dissociation occurs may be influenced by many factors such as hyper arousal 
mediated by personal and environment factors. They also emphasize the importance of 
further investigation into the specific processes by which these factors actually serve to 
influence the development of PTSD.  
 
Theoretical models are important to explain the factors that render an individual 
vulnerable to the development of PTSD and to account for the range of symptoms 
experienced. They also have important implications for treatment techniques.   
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Models of PTSD 
 
 
Social Cognitive Theories 
 
Social cognitive theories include Horowitz‟s (1982, 1986) Stress Response Theory 
and Janoff-Bulman‟s (1989, 1992) Theory of Shattered Assumptions. They both emphasize 
the wider impact of the trauma on people‟s lives and the marked readjustments that need to 
be made to reintegrate the information with people‟s existing schemas. Horowitz (1982, 
1986) proposes that individuals have a “completion tendency”, which is an intrinsic drive 
to make their mental models coherent with current information. This maintains the trauma 
in an “active memory” resulting in re-experiencing symptoms (e.g. unwanted intrusions) 
when the person attempts to integrate the new trauma related information with pre-existing 
schemas. The individual adopts defensive responses, such as denial, to avoid the intense 
emotion that accompanies such symptoms. Defensive responses may prevent emotional 
processing of the event and lead to a persistence of symptoms. Janoff-Bulman‟s (1989, 
1992) framework is consistent with Horowitz‟s “completion tendency”. She advocates that 
people have intrinsic motivation to make sense of and find meaning in their experiences. 
She identified significant assumptions that may influence one‟s response to trauma such as 
„the world is benevolent‟, „the world is meaningful‟ and „the self is worthy‟ (Brewin & 
Holmes 2003).  
 
According to these models exposure therapy and cognitive therapy (e.g. 
challenging erroneous beliefs related to the trauma) is necessary for the trauma to be 
processed fully and for symptom alleviation (e.g. a reduction in intrusions). These models 
don‟t specify the cognitive processes involved in the persistent use of maladaptive coping 
strategies following trauma that leads to the persistence of symptoms in PTSD (Brewin & 
Holmes, 2003).  While such models indicate the presence of schema driven processing of 
threat they do not specifically account for the role of attentional bias in PTSD. Treatment 
does not involve the direct modification of attentional processes.  
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Emotional Processing Theory (EPT) 
 
The EPT (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa & Riggs, 1993) holds that when a situation 
acquires a meaning of threat it forms a fear network in memory. This model proposes that 
PTSD is mediated by networks of mental representations of trauma related stimuli, 
responses (cognitive, behavioural and physiological) and information which links the 
stimulus and response elements together. Activation of these networks by threatening 
stimuli (e.g. reminders of the trauma) results in an attentional bias to potential threats, 
intrusive thoughts, and erroneous beliefs related to the trauma and an unrealistic sense of 
fear in the individual (Litz & Keane, 1989). The threshold for activation of the fear 
structure is lower in those with PTSD than individuals without. Attempts to prevent 
activation of the fear network leads to behavioral and cognitive avoidance. Integration of 
the trauma memory involves activation of the fear network, so that it is accessible for 
modification with the presentation of information that is incompatible with the fear 
network (Brewin et al. 1996).  Foa and Rothbaum (1998) suggest that individuals with a 
negative cognitive processing style and pre-trauma views of the self as incompetent and 
the world as unsafe maybe at greater risk of developing PTSD (Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  
 
Based on this theory exposure allows habituation and permits emotional processing 
of the event and the need for avoidance is reduced (Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989). In 
support of this theory evidence suggests that exposure is an effective treatment strategy in 
PTSD (Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991; Foa, Dancu, Hembree, Jaycox, 
Meadows, et al., 1999). However other elements such as the hypothesis that improvement 
in symptoms is related to change in memory structures, has received less support (Brewin 
& Holmes, 2003). While this theory acknowledges that activation of fear networks leads to 
an attentional bias towards threat, and that individuals may attempt to avoid threatening 
stimuli to prevent activation of fear networks, it does not describe in detail the role of 
attentional processes or levels of attention in the etiology and maintenance of symptoms 
and treatment does not focus on the modification of attentional processes. Attentional bias 
appears to be viewed as automatic resulting from “spreading activation” in the fear 
network. 
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Dual Representation Theory (DRT) 
 
This model proposed by Brewin, et al., (1996) attempts to integrate social cognitive 
and fear network approaches by proposing that traumas give rise to two types of memory: 
a „verbally accessible memory‟ (VAM) system comprising of information that was 
consciously processed during the trauma and a „situationally accessible memory‟ (SAM) 
system that is automatically accessible through appropriate situational cues. These 
different types of memory system are used to explain processes involved in emotionally 
processing the trauma and PTSD symptoms (e.g. intrusive thoughts). VAMs contain 
information that has received adequate processing and is integrated with autobiographical 
memories. These memories can be verbally communicated to others but information is 
limited to what was consciously attended to. Due to the impact of heightened arousal and 
anxiety on attention, only certain parts of the traumatic event might have received 
sufficient processing to become verbally accessible (Brewin et al., 1996).  Emotions that 
accompany VAMs include those experienced at the time of the trauma and also those 
generated by retrospective appraisals. SAMs differ in that they are involuntarily triggered 
by reminders of the trauma. They contain information obtained from lower level perceptual 
processing of the trauma that was not consciously attended to. When these memories are 
activated they are re-experienced in the present and this representation of ongoing threat 
accounts for the presence of attentional biases. SAMs do not use a verbal code and are 
difficult to communicate verbally. They are difficult to control and when triggered people 
can experience intense emotions. Distressing symptoms such as flashbacks are accounted 
for by SAMs.  
 
Healthy emotional processing involves the management of flashbacks and the 
resolution of negative cognitions (Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  Brewin (2001) has linked 
these memory structures to findings in cognitive neuroscience proposing that the 
hippocampus and amygdala provide a plausible neural basis for these separate memory 
systems. Unlike previous theories this theory has not led to the development of a specific 
therapeutic model.  While preliminary evidence in support of this model is derived from 
clinical and analogue studies (e.g. Brewin & Saunders, 2001; Holmes, Brewin & 
Hennessy, 2002) a great deal more research is necessary before the basic ideas are 
supported. This theory has placed slightly greater emphasis on attentional processes then 
previous theories. The impact of heightened arousal and anxiety on attention is held 
responsible for difficulties encoding and retrieving trauma information.  SAMs are held 
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accountable for the persistence of threat and the presence of attentional bias. However the 
components of this attentional bias are not elaborated on and treatment implications do not 
implicate the modification of attentional control facilitating emotional processing. 
 
Cognitive Model of PTSD 
 
Ehlers and Clark (2000) have developed a cognitive model, which suggests that 
PTSD persists when individuals process the trauma in a way that leads to a sense of serious 
current threat. A feeling of constant threat results from an excessively negative evaluation 
of the trauma and a disturbance in the memory of the event. This is characterized by poor 
elaboration and contextualization, strong associative memory and strong perceptual 
priming (a reduced perceptual threshold for these stimuli). This model provides an account 
of the importance of cognitive processing styles such as persistent use of rumination and 
maladaptive behavioral strategies (e.g. avoidance of trauma reminders to control anxiety) 
in maintaining disorder.  Such strategies maintain disorder by preventing cognitive change 
and otherwise healthy adaptation and restoration of these appraisal and memory systems 
(Agar, Kennedy, & King, 2006; Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  
 
In accordance with this theory treatment implications are proposed as follows: (1) 
elaboration and integration of the trauma memory (2) modification of problematic 
appraisals of the trauma and (3) cessation of dysfunctional behavioral and cognitive 
strategies that prevent memory elaboration and lead to a persistence of symptoms. This 
model proposes that disrupted memory may be maintained by a number of maladaptive 
coping strategies, however again an important role is assigned to memory and attentional 
processes are not the direct focus of treatment. 
 
The Metacognitive Model of PTSD 
 
The Metacognitive Model of PTSD (Wells 2000; Wells & Sembi, 2004a) is based 
on the S-REF Model (Wells & Matthews, 1994) which emphasizes the importance of 
attentional control in emotional disorders. The S-REF model suggests that how individuals 
respond to thoughts is more important than the content of thoughts. According to the 
Metacognitive Model for PTSD (Wells, 2000) stress symptoms such as intrusive thoughts 
are normal and necessary after trauma. They are a sign that an individual is attempting to 
emotionally process the trauma and adjust to the event in a way that enhances future 
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coping. For most people this process (reflexive adaptive process, RAP), continues 
uninterrupted and symptoms naturally subside. However symptoms persist and lead to 
PTSD when this process is interrupted by a self-focused style of thinking called the 
cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS). The CAS in PTSD consists of: 1) worrying, 
rumination and „gap filling‟ (going over memory) 2) attentional strategies of threat 
monitoring (e.g. scanning the street for signs of danger) and 3) maladaptive coping 
strategies (e.g. checking, avoidance, thought suppression). The CAS causes persistent 
threat related processing called “trauma lock” and is driven by beliefs about thinking 
(metacognitive beliefs) (Wells, 2009; Wells & Sembi, 2004).  
 
Two types of metacognitive belief, positive and negative, are implicated (Wells, 
2000). Positive metacognitive beliefs relate to the perceived usefulness of strategies such 
as worry (e.g. „if I worry I will be prepared‟), rumination (e.g. „I must go over the event to 
make sense of it‟), gap filling (e.g. „It is important not to have gaps in my memory‟) and 
threat monitoring (e.g. If I look out for signs of danger I will prevent another attack). 
Negative metacognitive beliefs concern the uncontrollability, danger and negative 
evaluation of thoughts (e.g. „my worrying is uncontrollable‟; „If I keep thinking about the 
trauma I will lose my mind‟). Such beliefs and the persistent use of maladaptive thought 
control and attentional strategies are an attempt to regulate emotion but they backfire as 
they maintain a sense of threat and result in persistence of traumatic stress symptoms, and 
the development of PTSD. 
 
Evidence for the Metacognitive Model of PTSD 
 
This model predicts that worry and rumination disrupt natural recovery and lead to 
an increase in symptoms and the development of PTSD. The use of worry and rumination 
as coping strategies to control intrusive thoughts has been positively associated with a 
vulnerability to stress and psychopathology (Wells & Davies, 1994). Two studies using 
analogue samples manipulated post stress-exposure and found that increased worry led to 
an increase in intrusive thoughts (Butler, Wells, & Deswick, 1995; Wells & 
Papageourgiou, 1995). Warda and Bryant (1998) reported that survivors of motor vehicle 
accidents (MVA‟s) who developed acute stress disorder (ASD) used worry and 
punishment based thought control strategies in comparison to those without ASD. In a 
prospective study of survivors of MVA‟s, worry as a thought control strategy predicted the 
development of PTSD three months later (Holeva, Tarrier & Wells, 2001).  
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Roussis and Wells (2006; 2008) provided further support for the model when they 
found that thought control strategies and metacognitive beliefs were positively associated 
with stress symptoms using student samples. Roussis and Wells (2006) assessed college 
student (n = 171) cross-sectionally and found that „worry‟ and positive and negative 
metacognitions were positively associated with stress symptoms. Roussis and Wells (2008) 
assessed college student (n = 101) twice over a three month period. Consistent with 
predictions of the MCT Model of PTSD (Wells, 2000) the use of worry as a thought 
control strategy was positively predictive of stress symptoms. 
 
A longitudinal study found rumination after stressful life events was associated 
with increased levels of subsequent stress symptoms and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000). A study conducted with children (O‟Kearney, Speyer, and Kenardy, 2007) found 
that children who continually went over the event in an attempt to make sense of it were 
more likely to experience an increase of intrusive thoughts.  
 
Bennett and Wells (2010) found that beliefs about the trauma predicted PTSD 
symptoms while memory disorganisation, often believed to be significant in PTSD did not. 
This is in agreement with a previous study (van Minnen, Wessel, Dijkstra & Roelofs, 
2002) which failed to find a significant association between memory disorganization and 
posttraumatic stress symptoms. These findings suggest that instead of attempting to 
integrate the trauma memory, it may be more effective to target metacognitive beliefs and 
the unhelpful coping strategies that arise from them. 
 
Implications for Treatment 
 
` Wells (2000) proposes treating PTSD by modifying and removing features of the 
CAS such as worry, rumination and threat monitoring. Wells and Sembi (2004a) describe 
the metacognitive treatment for PTSD. Patients are socialized to the metacognitive model 
of PTSD and the experience of symptoms such as intrusive thoughts are normalized. 
Individuals learn a new way of responding to their thoughts through techniques such as 
detached mindfulness and attention modification.  Unhelpful coping strategies (e.g. 
worrying, gap filling, threat monitoring) are banned and metacognitive beliefs (e.g.” I must 
not have gaps in my memory”), are challenged and modified.  
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The effectiveness of MCT for PTSD has been demonstrated in several studies (e.g. 
Colbear & Wells, 2008; Wells & Sembi, 2004b; Wells, Welford, Fraser, King, Mendel, et 
al. 2008). In all studies the length of treatment was relatively short (5 – 11 sessions) and 
was associated with significant reductions in traumatic stress symptoms, anxiety and 
depression. This treatment may have a number of potential advantages over standard CBT. 
Often patients find exposure work distressing due to an initial increase in anxiety and stress 
symptoms (e.g. Tarrier, Pilgrim, Sommerfield, Farragher, Reynolds, et al., 1999). 
Metacognitive therapy for PTSD differs from standard CBT, in that it does not involve the 
use of exposure (imaginal reliving) (e.g. Foa & Kozak, 1986) and may be more acceptable 
to the patient. This type of therapy may also reduce the possible risk of vicarious 
traumatization of the therapist.  
 
Interim Summary 
 
In summary, even though general cognitive models of anxiety give attentional 
processes a central prominence, specific cognitive models of PTSD predominantly focus 
on memory processes and little or no emphasis is placed on attentional processes. 
Treatment is aimed at reintegration of the trauma memory through exposure and cognitive 
restructuring.  An exception is the Metacognitive Model of PTSD (Wells, 2000) based on 
the S-REF model where the role of attentional control is given central importance and little 
or no emphasis is placed on the role of memory in the maintenance of disorder. 
 
Attentional bias in PTSD 
 
It has been proposed that voluntary strategic processing is an important influence 
on attentional bias and is considerably more widespread than automatic bias in emotional 
disorder (for a review see Matthews & Wells, 2000). What is the evidence base supporting 
a role of attention in PTSD? Buckley, et al., (2000) reviewed studies assessing attentional 
bias in PTSD using a variety of experimental tasks, and concluded that individuals with 
PTSD show an attentional bias towards trauma related stimuli, indicative of strategic 
processing. Evidence for the presence of automatic processing was inconclusive.  
 
Some studies have suggested that there is an attentional bias operating very early in 
processing (e.g. Harvey et al., 1996; Bryant & Harvey, 1997). Harvey et al., (1996) used 
the masked Stroop Task, which indicated slowed color naming following the masked 
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presentation of trauma words in motor vehicle accident (MVA) survivors with PTSD in 
comparison to MVA survivors without PTSD and non-MVA participants. These results 
suggested attentional bias for threat could be demonstrated at a preconscious stage of 
processing. Stimuli presentation was rapid aimed to target preconscious automatic 
processes. 
 
In a follow up study Bryant and Harvey (1997) found similar effects using the 
Modified Dot Probe Task, which illustrated speeded reaction time to threat words. They 
reported a facilitation effect for threat words relative to neutral words in an MVA- PTSD 
group. This facilitation effect was not present in the two comparison groups. However, 
comparable results were not obtained using an auditory recognition task (Trandel & 
McNally, 1987). This task requires subjects to listen to a binaural audiotape consisting of 
white noise with target words of different emotional valence played intermittently over the 
noise. Individuals with PTSD did not identify more threat words in comparison to other 
groups. Strong conclusions can‟t be drawn as the number of studies and number of 
participants is small. Further studies concerning automatic processes are warranted.  
 
Most of the literature investigating attentional bias in PTSD has used the 
(unmasked) modified Stroop task (Buckley et al., 2000). Predictions in relation to this task 
include: 1) PTSD patients will take more time to name the color of trauma words then non-
trauma words 2) This effect should be specific to PTSD i.e. traumatized individuals who 
don‟t suffer from PTSD and other anxious groups should not show this interference effect. 
Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak and McCarthy (1991) found that rape victims with PTSD 
took longer to respond to rape specific words relative to rape victims without PTSD and a 
non-traumatized control group. In comparison to the control groups the PTSD group 
illustrated differential responding to type of word as well e.g. slower response times to rape 
specific words then other words. Cassiday, McNally and Zeitlin, (1992) found similar 
results, rape victims with PTSD showed delayed response times for the PTSD words, while 
the control groups ( rape victims without PTSD and non-traumatised controls) did not. 
These effects have also been demonstrated in MVA survivors with PTSD and survivors of 
a ferry accident (e.g. Bryant & Harvey, 1995, Beck, et al., 2001; Thrasher, Dalgleish, & 
Yule, 1994). 
 
Bryant and Harvey (1995) found that an MVA-PTSD group showed stronger 
interference for strong threat words in comparison to the control groups (an MVA- driving 
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phobia group and a low anxiety group) who did not demonstrate this interference effect. 
Beck et al., (2001) found that colour naming was significantly slower in a PTSD/pain 
group in comparison with two other groups (a no PTSD/Pain group and a no PTSD/ No 
pain group). The PTSD/Pain group showed significant response delays to both accident 
and pain related words, whereas the No PTSD/pain group showed delays to pain stimuli 
only.  Similar effects have been demonstrated for war veterans (e.g. McNally, English, & 
Lipke, 1993; McNally et al. 1990), and burn victims (Sveen, Dyster-Aas, & Willebrand, 
2009; Willebrand, Norlund, Kildal, Gerdin, Ekselious, et al., 2002).  
 
In summary, there is evidence of attentional bias for threat and emotion material in 
PTSD. This effect has been demonstrated in different attention-task paradigms and 
following different forms of trauma exposure. There is limited support for the concept that 
such biases operate automatically due to limitations of the paradigms used that cannot rule 
out controlled processing. However, the distinction between levels of control of attention is 
important as it presents different clinical implications and gives rise to different treatment 
techniques. These techniques will focus on either retraining automatic processes or on 
practicing flexible control of attention irrespective of the occurrence of events.   
 
Modification of Attentional Biases 
 
A number of treatment techniques have been developed from theoretical models 
(e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Wells & Matthews, 1994) with the aim of modifying 
attentional bias and improving attentional control. These different attention training 
techniques are grounded in the two different theoretical models. Mathews and MacLeod 
(2002) advocate the use of an implicit technique targeting automatic processes.  Wells 
(1990) has developed an explicit attention training technique targeting strategic processes. 
While he does not rule out the contribution of automatic processes he argues that strategic 
processing is predominantly responsible for perseverative processing and failure to down 
regulate distressing emotion. 
 
Attentional Training Technique (ATT) 
 
The ATT (Wells, 1990) is an externally focused auditory exercise, derived from the 
S-REF Model. It was developed with the aim of treating the CAS by reducing self-focus 
and directly modifying the control of attention. This allows for the processing of corrective 
31 
 
information and facilitates metacognitive change. Training in this strategy following 
exposure to trauma, may disrupt preservative processing (e.g. rumination) allowing healthy 
emotional processing to take place and reduce symptoms such as intrusive thoughts. The 
ATT consists of three categories of auditory attentional exercises: (1) selective attention 
(focusing attention on individual sounds and spatial locations), (2) attention switching 
(rapidly shifting attention between different sounds and spatial locations and (3) divided 
attention (attending to as many simultaneous sounds and spatial locations as possible). The 
procedure is designed so that it consistently loads attention. Between 6 and 9 sounds are 
typically introduced in combination with spatial locations.  
 
Participants are asked to focus on a visual fixation point and remain visually 
focused throughout the exercise. The aim is to follow the instructions irrespective of 
intrusive thoughts. They should be treated as additional noise, which are not given 
attentional priority. ATT should be presented with a treatment rationale individually 
tailored to the specific disorder. This is important to facilitate understanding of the 
technique and enhance motivation for homework compliance. It should not be used as a 
coping strategy or as a form of distraction or avoidance of intrusive thoughts (Wells, 
2009). 
 
Table 1 summarizes ten research studies investigating the impact of ATT in a 
variety of samples. A growing body of research has investigated the impact of ATT for a 
variety of emotional disorders including: panic disorder (Wells, 1990; Wells, White & 
Carter, 1997), social phobia (Wells et al., 1997; McEvoy & Perini, 2009), hypochondrias 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 1998; Cavanagh & Franklin, 2000), major depression 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2000; Siegle, Ghinassi, & Thase, 2007), obsessional intrusive 
thoughts (Watson & Purdon, 2008), treatment of auditory hallucinations (Valmaggia, 
Bouman, & Schuurman, 2007) and traumatic stress symptoms (Nassif & Wells, 2011). 
 
Two studies have supported the effect of ATT in three patients who met the DSM 
III-R criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) for Panic Disorder (PD). The first 
study (Wells, 1990) used a reversal design and revealed that a procedure evoking external 
attentional focus eliminated panic attacks and reduced self-reported tension; whereas self-
focused autogenic training (Schultz & Luthe, 1969) increased the frequency of panic 
attacks and the intensity of anxiety. Wells et al., (1997) replicated these treatment effects 
of ATT in a systematic replication case series (Sidman, 1960) using a withdrawal design. 
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Follow up data indicated symptom reduction was maintained at follow-up. Limitations of 
these studies include the small sample size, use of self-report measures and the possible 
role of non-specific factors such as placebo effects.  
 
Another reversal methodology (Wells et al., 1997) supported the effects of ATT in 
reducing anxiety and negative beliefs in a diagnosed case of social phobia. Similar to a 
previous study (Wells, 1990) this involved reversing the mechanisms of ATT by a self-
focused manipulation and then successfully reducing symptoms again by reintroducing 
ATT. Results were maintained at follow-up. McEvoy and Perini (2009) investigated 
whether supplementing cognitive behavioral group therapy (CBGT) with ATT could lead 
to significant improvements across outcome measures in comparison to a control group 
who received CBGT with relaxation training (RT). They reported that both groups showed 
similar improvement across outcome measures. However this study was flawed as both 
conditions received CBGT based on a cognitive model of social phobia (Clarke & Wells, 
1995) which involves shifting attention to external focus which means that both groups 
received an externally focused attentional manipulation of some kind, which is likely to 
limit the “added value” of ATT. 
 
Papageorgiou and Wells (1998) investigated the effects of ATT in a case series 
with three patients who satisfied DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) for hypochondrias. They 
received an average of 9 sessions and were instructed to practice twice a day. ATT 
produced clinically significant effects in self-report measures of affect, illness related 
behavior, cognitions and somatosensory amplification. Treatment gains were maintained at 
follow-up. Measures of self-focused attention indicated that the ATT procedure appeared 
to act on attentional processes as hypothesized.   
 
Cavanagh and Franklin (2000) conducted a randomized controlled trial evaluating 
the impact of ATT on hypochondriasis. They allocated patients to six sessions of ATT and 
a no treatment control. The ATT group showed a significant improvement in a range of 
outcome measures in comparison to the control group who showed no improvement. 
Outcome measures included degree of health worry, disease conviction and behavioural 
measures at post-treatment and results were maintained at 18 months follow up.  
 
Papageorgiou and Wells (2000) evaluated the effectiveness of ATT in the treatment 
of recurrent major depression in a consecutive single case series of 4 patients. They were 
assigned to no treatment baselines of 3 to 5 weeks and received 5 to 8 weekly sessions of 
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ATT. All patients showed clinically significant reductions in anxiety and depression, and 
scores fell within the normal range on completion of ATT. Attentional and metacognitive 
factors showed similar improvements. Treatment gains were maintained at follow up.  
 
Siegle, Ghinassi and Thase (2007) randomly assigned depressed patients to ATT 
plus treatment as usual or just treatment as usual.  Patients who received 2 weeks of the 
ATT showed significantly greater improvements in depression and rumination then those 
receiving treatment as usual.  In a sub sample the neuropsychological effects were 
examined using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and pupil dilation. 
Preliminary fMRI data showed neuropsychological changes in amygdala activity in the 
attention training group. Again the small sample size limits the generalisability of results. 
 
Valmaggia, Bouman and Schuurman (2007) assessed the impact of ATT on 
auditory hallucinations in a patient with a diagnosis of schizophrenia who had failed to 
respond to earlier treatment. They appeared to find an improvement in symptoms but no 
firm conclusion could be drawn as no baseline information had been collected. This patient 
had also received CBT and the possibility of carry over effects must be considered.  
 
Watson and Purdon (2007) designed a study to investigate the effectiveness of ATT 
in the reduction and reappraisal of intrusive thoughts in an analogue sample of 108 
individuals with obsessive compulsive symptoms. Participants were randomly assigned to 
different groups: an ATT condition (one session), a thought replacement condition, a 
distraction condition and a no intervention condition. They asked students to identify a 
distressing intrusive thought and spend seven minutes monitoring their stream of 
consciousness for the occurrence of that thought. They then obtained ratings of distress 
associated with that thought, and rated their success at dismissing that thought from 
consciousness. They reported none of the active interventions including ATT were superior 
to the control. However results should be interpreted with caution. It is likely that 
insignificant results were due to methodological issues. ATT is not intended for use as a 
coping strategy, as this transforms it into a cognitive avoidance strategy (Wells, 2009). It is 
unclear if it was administered with a disorder specific rationale and no homework practice 
was involved, moreover one session of ATT is unlikely to be an effective dose. 
 
Nassif and Wells (2011) explored the impact of ATT on traumatic stress symptoms 
in a sub-clinical sample of university students (n = 42). They included students who had 
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experienced a stressful life event and still experienced intrusive thoughts about it that they 
rated as distressing. Participants were asked to narrate their stressful life event and record 
the number of intrusions they experienced when listening back to it. The experimental 
group received ATT (3 to 4 sessions) and the control group completed a filler task. Both 
groups were then asked to listen to their stressful narrative for a second time and re-rate the 
number of intrusion they experienced. The ATT group showed a reduction in the incidence 
of intrusions that was three times greater in the group that received ATT compared to the 
control group and the effect size was large (d = 0.95). They also reported an increase in 
attention flexibility and a reduction in self-focus, supporting the theoretical basis for ATT. 
The study was limited by the use of self-report measures and the small sample size. 
 
Attention Bias Modification Treatment (ABMT) 
 
ABMT has been described as a new and promising treatment for anxiety disorders 
(Bar-Haim, 2010; Hakamata, Lissek, Britton, Fox, Leibenjuft, et al., 2010).  Central to the 
rationale of AMBT is the idea that cognitive tasks (e.g. The Dot Probe Task) that have 
demonstrated the existence of attentional bias in anxious individuals can be implicitly 
modified to manipulate attention biases and reduce anxiety (Bar-Haim, 2010). It is 
hypothesized that attention bias in anxiety involves both cortical and subcortical processes 
(Dickie & Armony, 2008). It is suggested that techniques targeting top-down processes 
(e.g. CBT, ATT) may fail to modify this subcortical component which may be more 
efficiently reached by AMBT with its more repetitive computer based training methods 
(LeDoux, 2000; Pine, Helfenstein, Bar-Haim, Nelson, & Fox, 2009).  
 
Most studies (e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) use variants of the dot probe task. 
Table 2 summarizes 11 studies using this task. Attentional bias towards threat is revealed 
when participants are faster at responding to probes that replace threat related stimuli then 
neutral stimuli. In a training protocol intended to induce threat attentional bias away from 
threat and towards neutral stimuli, targets appear more frequently at the location of the 
neutral stimuli then the threat. These tasks are based on the assumption that an implicitly 
learned bias away from threat is induced through a systematic repetition of 10‟s or 100‟s of 
trials. A number of studies have investigated the impact of ABMT. In a meta-analyses 
Hakamata et al. (2010) reviewed 12 RCT‟s to summarise the effect of ABMT on anxiety. 
Data from 12 publications (n = 467) met inclusion criteria and indicated that ABMT 
produced greater reductions in anxiety than control training, with a medium effect size 
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(Hedge‟s d = .61, p < 0.001).  These studies have assessed the impact of ABM in clinical 
and non-clinical populations.  
 
Two studies have investigated the impact of AMBT in the treatment of pathological 
worrying. Amir, Beard, Burns and Bomyea, (2009a) reported that 8 sessions of AMBT 
reduced attentional bias and decreased scores on self-report measures of anxiety and 
depression. Participants who met DSM criteria for GAD were randomly assigned to an 
Attention modification program (n = 14) (AMB) and an attention control condition (n = 
15) (ACC). Each condition involved 240 trials. For the AMB group on 66% of these trials 
probes directly followed the neutral word. In the ACC group during trials the probe 
appeared with equal frequency in the position of the threat and neutral word. This study 
was limited by the small sample size and lack of follow up data. 
 
Hazen, Vasey and Schmidt (2009) found similar results in a sample of 24 university 
students reporting severe worry, included on the basis of  a score of 60 or above on the 
PSWQ. They were randomly assigned (12 in each group) to receive 5 (30 minute) sessions 
of either attentional retraining or sham training. There were 216 trials on each session. The 
treatment group received attentional retraining for threat stimuli (ARTS) procedure; probes 
followed the neutral word on nearly all trials (similar to MacLeod et al. 2002.) All included 
one threat and one neutral word. On 204 (94.4%) of these trials, the probes appeared in the 
position of the neutral words. In the SHAM ARTS condition probes appeared in equal 
frequency in the position of threat-relevant and neutral words. Effect sizes indicated 
training was perhaps more effective for general anxiety symptoms than worry (see table 2). 
The small sample size meant an inability to test whether or not changes in symptoms due 
to treatment were mediated by changes in threat bias. Another limitation is the lack of 
follow up data beyond one week post assessment.  
 
Three dot probe studies using neutral and disgust faces as cue stimuli applied ABM 
protocols to reduce social anxiety. Schmidt, Richey, Buckner and Timpano (2009) applied 
AT protocols to reduce social anxiety in patients (N = 36) with a primary diagnosis of 
generalized SAD. Treatment involved 8 sessions over four weeks, each had 160 trials (128 
critical trials) Participants were randomly assigned to either an AT group (designed to 
reduce vigilance for threat) or to a control dot-probe task group. 72% in the AT group no 
longer met diagnostic criteria for SAD compared to 11% in the control group. This study 
was limited by the small sample size. 
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Amir, Beard, Taylor, Klumpp, Elias and Burns (2009b) found similar results 
suggesting that AMP facilitated attention disengagement from threat from pre to post-
assessment and reduced clinician and self-reports of anxiety. Both studies found that 
treatment effects were maintained at four month follow up. Using a similar design , Amir, 
Weber, Beard, Bomyea and Taylor, (2008), reported the AMP group showed significantly 
less attention bias to threat after training and lower levels of anxiety in response to a public 
speaking challenge than did the participants in the ACC group. Their speeches were also 
judged as superior in quality in comparison to the control group. 
 
  Finally, Dandeneau and Pruessner (2007) examined the impact of ABM training 
on individuals with low self-esteem. They used a visual search task to repeatedly train 
participants to locate a single smiling face in a matrix of frowning faces. They found that 
those who were trained to modify their attentional bias to reduce vigilance for social threat 
showed lower self-reported stress related to their final exams.   
 
Following from the work of MacLeod et al., (2002), Elder, Ricon and Bar Haim 
(2008) investigated the association between attention bias and anxiety in a sample of 7 – 
12 year old children (N = 26). Children were randomly assigned to two groups (Standard 
training away from threat and standard training towards threat). They successfully induced 
a bias in non-anxious children who received training towards threat in comparison to the 
control group. Both groups reported increased depression scores following stress-
induction. Only children in the attention training group reported an increase in anxiety 
scores.  
 
Klump and Amir (2010) attempted to induce bias towards threat in anxious 
students. They had three conditions: 1) standard training away from threat, 2) placebo 
training condition and 3) training towards threat. The third condition was to test the 
prediction that enhanced attentional control rather than a more efficient attentional 
disengagement is achieved through training.  Response time in relation to attentional 
training was largely inconclusive. Both groups who were trained to attend toward and 
away from threat exhibited a relative decrease in anxiety during a subsequent speech 
challenge compared to a control group.  
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In a different line of research investigating the potential preventative impact of 
ABMT on anxiety, See, MacLeod and Bridle (2009) administered dot probe training to 
Singaporean students before moving to Australia. Half of the participants were randomly 
assigned to attention training away from threat words and half received placebo control 
training, not designed to change attention patterns. Training appeared to reduce anxiety 
response to the upcoming stressor and reduced state anxiety upon arrival in Australia.   
 
Summary of Both Techniques and Future Directions 
 
A number of methodological limitations are evident from these studies. Both 
techniques cite the use of standardised outcome measures. These may be subject to 
response bias and future research should include more objective measures. The inclusion 
of an emotional attention set shifting task would be useful to examine the impact of ATT 
and AMBT on attentional control.  
 
Hakamata et al., (2010) reviewed AMBT studies and reported that procedural 
factors predicted response in that the nature of stimuli and their location moderated 
outcome. Studies that used a top bottom stimulus presentation achieved better results than 
those using a side-by-side presentation, as did studies that used words instead of pictures. 
They also reported that length of training appeared to moderate effects on attention bias but 
not anxiety symptoms. This indicates the clinical meaningfulness of AMBT is uncertain 
and warrants further investigation. The use of analogue populations greatly limits 
generalisability of results. Only one study screened all participants using DSM criteria 
(Amir et al., 2009). Lack of follow up data reported by AMBT studies makes it difficult to 
estimate whether effects are long lasting. Lasting effects of training on both attention bias 
and anxiety should be measured in follow-up assessments. 
 
In contrast, most ATT studies have employed clinical populations and have 
reported significant reductions in symptoms and change in beliefs (Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2000) with treatment gains maintained at follow up (e.g. Canvanagh & Franklin, 2000). A 
pilot study (Siegle, Ghinassi, and Thase, 2007) has also successfully examined the 
neuropsychological effects of ATT on depressed patients, using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and reported changes in amygdala activity in the brain. 
However, the small sample sizes and lack of control groups limit interpretation of the data. 
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It is unclear for both techniques how many training sessions or trials would yield 
the highest therapeutic gain. In ABMT there is also considerable variability in the number 
of sessions and the number of trials per session. This ranges from 7500 trials delivered 
over ten sessions (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) to a single session of 160 trials (Amir et 
al., 2008) that lasts approximately 8 minutes. The number of sessions of ATT, including 
number of practice sessions has also varied between studies. As few as three to four 
sessions has been shown to be effective in significantly reducing traumatic stress 
symptoms in a student population with subclinical symptoms (Nassif & Wells, 2011). 
 
While ATT was originally designed as part of a treatment package these studies 
support its effectiveness as a stand-alone treatment approach (e.g. Wells et al., 1997). 
AMBT on the other hand appears to have been developed as a standalone technique. It is 
currently unclear if AMBT should remain a standalone treatment or become an established 
part of existing treatment. Future research of AMBT should examine whether threat 
content should be congruent with the type of specific anxiety disorder being treated. It is 
also unclear if the contingencies being trained should remain implicit or be explicitly 
spelled out for patients. For AMBT it is unclear whether anxiety reducing effects are 
specific to threat-related attentional training or a more general attention control process. 
The attention training bias modification studies generally do not include systematic testing 
of the general attentional control hypothesis. ATT studies have incorporated measures of 
self-focus and attention flexibility to test the mechanisms that may mediate symptom 
reduction (e.g. Nassif & Wells, 2011). Future research should perhaps look at comparing 
treatment as usual with treatment as usual and attention modification.  
 
Conclusions   
 
The effects of attentional bias in PTSD have been widely established (e.g. Buckley 
et al. 2000). The present paper distinguished between two level of control of attention: 
automatic and strategic. Most cognitive models of anxiety related bias implicate automatic 
processes but the S-REF model implicates strategic processing. Most cognitive models of 
PTSD apart from the metacognitive model implicate memory rather than attention. They 
do not give a comprehensive account of attentional processes. Treatment predominantly 
involves prolonged exposure and cognitive restructuring, giving little emphasis to 
attentional control. The metacognitive model of PTSD (Wells, 2000) suggests that instead 
of focusing on the integration of trauma memory, treatment should reduce threat 
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monitoring, strengthen executive control processes (to reduce worry and rumination) and 
ban maladaptive coping strategies (e.g. avoidance). Hence, the metacognitive model of 
PTSD (Wells, 2000; Wells & Sembi, 2004a) aims to modify attentional bias, as a strategic 
process, by targeting the CAS, an inflexible attentional style of thinking that maintains 
PTSD. A growing body of research offers support for the theoretical basis of the model 
(e.g. Roussis & Wells, 2006, 2008) and treatment effectiveness for PTSD (e.g. Colbear & 
Wells, 2008). 
 
A review of the studies of PTSD (e.g. Buckley et al. 2000) indicates that attentional 
bias occurs at a strategic stage in processing while studies investigating automatic 
attentional bias are inconclusive. Commonly used tasks to measure attentional bias such as 
the Stroop task and the dot probe have been criticized (Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and it 
has been suggested (Johnson, 2009) that an emotional attention set shifting task would be a 
useful adjunct in the assessment of attentional control in emotional disorders. 
 
Treatment techniques have been developed from theoretical models of attentional 
bias (e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Wells & Matthews, 1994) with the aim of 
modifying attentional bias and improving attentional control. Mathews and MacLeod 
(2002) advocate the use of an implicit technique targeting automatic processes. Wells and 
Matthews (1994) propose attentional bias to threatening stimuli is related to metacognitive 
knowledge and the individual‟s strategies they consciously employ in an attempt to 
regulate their emotion. Wells (1990) has developed an explicit attention training technique 
targeting strategic processes.  
 
Evidence supporting the effects of ATT appears to be more consistent than for 
AMBT. A greater number of studies have used clinical samples and the effects have been 
maintained at follow up but sample sizes are small. Techniques such as these may be 
important for individuals suffering from PTSD who can‟t tolerate the initial distress and 
increase in symptoms associated with techniques such as exposure and drop out of therapy. 
Treatment focusing on modifying attention is an important avenue for future research. 
Randomised controlled trials in both clinical and subclinical samples evaluating the impact 
of attentional training on traumatic symptoms are warranted.  These studies should use 
objective measures in conjunction with standardized self-report measures and results 
should be investigated over longer term follow-up. 
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Study Disorder/ 
Symptoms 
N Sample 
 
 
Screening 
Measure(s)   
Design Intervention(s) Outcome 
Measure(s) 
Results FU Data 
(Months) 
Wells (1990) PD 1 Clinical SCID Single case 
study 
 (2 treatment 
A-B-C-B 
design) 
No TR BL 
ATT plus HW  
Autogenic training 
ATT plus HW 
Panic Diary 
PQRST, 
STAI-S 
Anxiety 
Likert scale (0 
– 10) 
No longer satisfied DSM-III-R 
criteria for PD. 
3 & 12 
Wells, White 
& Carter 
(1997) 
PD 
  
SP 
3 Clinical SCID Systematic 
replication case 
series 
 
(2 PD:  
A-B-A 
„withdrawal‟ 
design) 
 
(1 SP: A-B-A-
C-A-B „true 
reversal‟ 
design) 
Pt 1: No  TR BL 
ATT plus HW 
  
Pt 2: No TR BL 
ATT plus HW 
 No TR  
 
Pt 3: No  TR BL 
ATT plus HW 
 No TR 
Autogenic training 
No TR 
ATT plus HW 
 
Panic Diary 
BAI 
Rating Scales  
 
No longer satisfied DSM-III-R 
criteria for PD or SP. 
 
3- 6  
Papageorgiou 
& Wells, 
(1998) 
 
Hypochondriasis 3 Clinical SCID Single case 
series (A-B-A 
design ) 
8 – 10  weekly 
sessions  plus HW 
practice 
BAI, GDS, 
SSAS, VAS 
No longer satisfied DSM-III-R 
criteria for Hypochondriasis. 
 
 
6   
Papageorgiou 
& Wells, 
(2000) 
Recurrent MD 4 Clinical SCID Single Case 
Series (A-B 
design) 
5 -8 weekly sessions 
of ATT, plus HW 
practice 
BDI, BAI, 
ATQ, RS, 
PSCS, MCQ 
No longer satisfied DSM-III-R 
criteria for MD 
Clinically significant 
improvements (SCID, BDI, 
BAI, ATQ, RS, PSCS & 
MCQ) 
3, 6 & 12 
Siegle, 
Ghinassi, & 
Thase (2007) 
MD TAU plus 
ATT (n = 15) 
 
TAU (n  = 8) 
Clinical SCID RCT TAU (medication, 
group 
psychotherapy, 
milieu therapy) 
 
TAU plus ATT 
BDI-II, RRS 
fMRI, pupil 
dilation 
Significant reduction in 
symptoms and depressive 
rumination. 
Neuropsychological changes 
in ATT group 
No FU 
Table 1: Summary of ATT studies reviewed 
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Note:  N 
= 
Sample Size; FU = Follow-up; PD = Panic Disorder, SCID = Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis IV disorders; TR = treatment; BL = baseline; ATT = Attention traiing Technique; HW = 
homework; PQRST = Personal Questionnaire Rapid Scaling Technique; STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version; DSM –III-R = Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third 
Edition, Revised; SP = Social Phobia; BAI = The Beck Anxiety Inventory; GDS = Geriatric Depression Scale; SSAS = Somatosensory Amplification Scale; VAS = Visual Analogue Scale (0 – 100); MD = 
Major depression; BDI = The Beck Depression Inventory; ATQ = Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire; RS = The short form of the Rumination Scale; PSCS = The Private Self Consciousness Scale; MCQ = the 
Meta-cognitions Questionnaire; RCT = Randomized Controlled Design TAU = Treatment As Usual; RRS = Ruminative Response Style Questionnaire; fMRI = Functional magnetic resonance imaging; 
PSYRATS = The Psychotic Symptom Rating; CON = control; DI = distraction instructions; TRI = thought replacement instructions; OCI = Obsessive Compulsory Inventory; III = Interpretation of Intrusions 
Inventory; DASS-21 = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – 21; GCBT = Group Cognitive Behavioural Therapy; CIDI – auto = Composite International Diagnostic Interview-Auto; SPS = Social Phobia Scale; 
SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; ACS = Attention Control Scale; WAI = The 36-item Working Alliance Inventory; GAS = The 20 –item Group Attitude Scale;  DMQ =  The Detached Mindfulness 
Questionnaire. 
 
 
 
Valmaggia, 
Bouman, & 
Schuurman, 
(2007) 
Auditory 
Hallucinations 
 
(Diagnosis of 
Schizophrenia) 
1 Clinical PSYRATS Single case 
series 
8 sessions plus HW PSYRATS Reduction in AH subscale 
(PSYRATS) 
Change in content, tone, 
perceived mastery of voice  
 
 
No FU 
Watson & 
Purdon 
(2008) 
Obsessional 
Intrusive 
Thoughts 
108 
ATT (n = 25 
TRI (n  =26) 
DI (n =29) 
CON (n =28) 
Analogue OCI RCT 1 session ATT (no 
HW) 
 
OCI, 
III,  
DASS-21 
All groups showed similar 
decreases across measures. 
 
List of several reasons for 
absence of group differences. 
No FU 
McEvoy & 
Perini, 2009 
Social Phobia 81 
 
CBGT + ATT 
(n =39 ) 
 
CBGT + CON 
(n = 42) 
Clinical SCID RCT 12 groups (6 in each 
condition) 
 
7 weekly 4 hour 
sessions of CBGT 
with either ATT or 
relaxation 
CIDI-Auto, 
SPS, SIAS, 
BDI, BDI-II, 
ACS, MCQ, 
WAI, GAS. 
Both groups achieved similar 
improvements on all measures. 
 
 
 
 
No FU 
Nassif & 
Wells, 2011 
Intrusive 
Thoughts 
42 
 
ΑΤΤ (n = 21) 
CON (n = 21) 
Analogue Distress 
rating of 
30% 
RCT 3 – 4 sessions Number of 
intrusions 
DMQ 
Reduction in number of 
intrusions in ATT group 
compared to control 
 
 
No FU 
42 
 
Table 2: Summary of AMBT studies using the Modified Dot Probe Task  
Study
1
 Population N 
 
ABMT 
CON
2
 
Paradigm (Stimuli) 
 
Threat 
content 
Attention 
redirection 
No of 
sessions 
(trials) 
Stressor Outcome 
Measure 
Results 
Hedges d
3
 Post-
Training (Post-
stressor) 
Mathews & 
MacLeod 
(2002, Expt7) 
 
High anxious 
 
29 
ABMT=15 
CON=14 
Dot Probe (words) Negative Neutral 10 (750) Exam STAI-T 5.79*** 
Mathews & 
MacLeod 
(2002, Expt8) 
 
High anxious 
 
30 
ABMT=14 
CON=16 
Dot Probe (words) Negative Neutral 8 (600) None STAI-T 5.76 
Amir et al. 
(2008) 
Socially anxious 
students 
48 
ABMT=22 
CON = 26 
Dot-Probe (faces) Disgust Neutral 8 (160) None STAI-T, 
LSAS 
SPAI,  
BDI-II 
HAM-D 
 SDS 
-0.10 
0.43 
-0.33 
1.12*** 
.058 
.89** 
 
Amir et al. 
(2009a) 
GAD Patients 29 
ABMT=14 
CON =15 
Dot-Probe (faces) Negative Neutral 8 (280) None STAI-T 
STAI-S 
BDI-II, 
WDQ 
PSWQ 
HRSA 
HAM-D 
1.06** 
1.63*** 
0.09 
0.72 
0.44 
0.99* 
0.43 
 
Amir et al. 
(2009b) 
High anxious  94 
ABMT=47 
CON=47 
 
Dot-Probe (faces) Disgust Neutral 1(128) Public 
speaking 
STAI-S 0.11 (1.07)*** 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise stated studies used a between subjects design 
2
 Control groups go through a normal dot-probe task (probe appears in either location with equal frequency) 
3
 Mean Effect Sizes( Hedge‟s d), definition of categories for d: no effect (0 – 0.2), low effect (0.2-0.5), medium effect (0.5-0.8), and high effect (>0.8) 
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Hazen et al. 
(2009) 
High Worry 
Students 
24 
ABMT=12 
CON =12 
Dot Probe (words) Negative Neutral 5 (1080) None PSWQ 
HRSA 
BDI 
1.10 
0.79 
1.00 
 
Schmidt et al. 
(2009) 
SP Patients 36 
ABMT=18 
CON = 18 
Dot-Probe (faces) Disgust Neutral 8 (160) None BSPS 
LSAS 
SPAI 
STAI-T 
BDI-II 
1.22** 
1.84 
1.46 
3.98 
1.12** 
 
See et al.(2009) Non-selected 40 
ABMT=22 
CON =18 
Dot Probe (words) Negative Neutral 15 (192) Moving 
abroad 
STAI-S 
STAI-T 
 
n/a (0.60 ) 
n/a (0.79*) 
Eldar & Bar-
Haim (2010) 
Low anxious 
students 
 
30 
ABMT=15 
CON = 15 
Dot-Probe (faces) Angry Neutral 1 (480) None STAI-S 0.01 
High anxious 
students 
30 
ABMT=15 
CON = 15 
Dot-Probe (faces) Angry Neutral 1 (480) None STAI-S -3.4 
Klump & Amir 
(2010) 
Socially anxious 
students 
53 
ABMT=31 
CON = 22 
Dot-Probe (faces) Disgust Neutral & 
Threat 
1 (480) Speech 
Task 
STAI-S -0.6 (0.36) 
 
Note: Adapted from “Attention Bias Modification Treatment: A Meta-Analysis towards the Establishment of Novel Treatment for Anxiety,” by Hakamata et al. (2010), Biological 
Psychiatry; 68, 982–990. ABMT = attention bias modification training; CON = Control; GSP = Generalised Social Phobia; STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait; LSAS = 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (clinician-administered); SPAI = Social Phobia and Anxiety Scale; BDI-II, Beck depression inventory-II; HAM-D, Hamilton Rating Scale of Depression 
(clinician-administered); SDS, Sheelen Disability Scale; STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State; GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder; BSPS, Brief Social Phobia Scale (clinician-
administered); PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire; WDQ = Worry Domains Questionnaire; HRSA, Hamilton Rating Scale of Anxiety (clinician-administered); SIAS, Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale; SPS, social phobia scale; FNES, Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. 
* p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p<0.001, 
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Abstract  
 
Attention training technique (ATT; Wells 1990) is a specific technique used in 
metacognitive therapy to modify metacognition and the control of attention. It aims to 
reduce self-focused attention, increase attention flexibility and change metacognitive 
strategies so that the person may discontinue preservative cognitive styles and threat 
monitoring behaviours. The present study investigated the impact of ATT on traumatic 
stress symptoms, in a sample of 60 university students, following exposure to a stressful 
life event. Participants were randomly assigned to either an ATT group (n = 29) or a 
control group (n = 31). An emotional attention set shifting task was included as an 
objective measure of attention flexibility. The results supported the hypotheses that ATT 
significantly reduces intrusions and negative affect in individuals who have experienced a 
stressful life event. The technique also reduced self-focused attention and increased 
attention flexibility on subjective and objective measures. The results suggest that ATT can 
be beneficial in reducing traumatic stress symptoms and the results add to studies 
suggesting positive effects of the technique across a range of disorders.  
 
Keywords: attention training, post traumatic stress disorder, intrusions, metacognition, 
attentional control 
 
Highlights: 
 
Intrusive thoughts and an attentional bias towards threatening information are prevalent 
symptoms of PTSD. 
 
The metacognitive model of PTSD (Wells, 2000) emphasizes the importance of attentional 
control in emotional disorders. 
 
Results add to the growing body of evidence supporting the effectiveness of ATT.  
 
Future research should examine the impact of ATT on traumatic stress symptoms in a 
clinical population. 
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Introduction 
Research suggests that 50 – 60% of people will experience a traumatic event 
(Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995). A triggering event or trauma is the 
most reliable predictor of PTSD and is necessary for a diagnosis (American Psychiatric 
Association, APA, 2000). Whilst the majority of people adapt to traumatic events and 
continue to resume their regular routine, a significant minority fail to adapt successfully. 
The risk of developing PTSD after a traumatic event is 8.1% for men and 20.4% for 
women (Kessler et al., 1995). Furthermore research suggests that depressive 
symptomology affects between 30% and 50% of persons diagnosed with PTSD (Nixon, 
Resick, & Nishith, 2004). 
 
A common distressing symptom of PTSD is that of intrusive thoughts, which can 
be described as re-experiencing symptoms (DSM –IV TR criteria: APA; 2000). Intrusive 
thoughts have been defined as „distinct thoughts, images or impulses that enter conscious 
awareness on a recurrent basis, are difficult to control, and interfere with ongoing cognitive 
and behavioral activity‟ (Clark, 2005). Cognitive models of PTSD emphasize difficulties 
encoding the trauma memory, as a key factor in the development of subsequent intrusions 
(e.g., Foa & Riggs, 1993; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  
 
PTSD is also characterized by an attentional bias towards the identification of 
threatening stimuli (Harvey, Bryant & Rapee, 1996, Beck, Freeman, Shipherd, Hamblen & 
Lackner,. 2001; Bryant & Harvey, 1995). Attention appears to be drawn to stimuli that 
remind an individual of past trauma and this can exacerbate the fear of future similar 
events (Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996).  
 
The main paradigm used to test this attentional bias has been the modified Stroop 
test (Stroop, 1935) that requires individuals to color name words that are emotionally 
laden. Attentional bias identified by the task has been demonstrated for a number of 
disorders but is generally larger for PTSD then any other group (Williams et al., 1996). 
The dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) has also demonstrated attentional 
bias in PTSD (e.g. Bryant & Harvey, 1997) by measuring response latency to name neutral 
target words that are presented adjacent to or distant to threat words. However both tasks 
have been criticized for being ambiguous regarding the exact nature of threat related bias 
(Derryberry & Reed, 1994; Pollack & Tolley-Schnell, 2003). This ambiguity focuses on 
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whether delayed reaction time (RT) for negative material is due to vigilance or avoidance. 
Regardless of this point the delayed RT represents a bias of attentional control. For 
example individuals are supposed to be naming the color, not reading the word, so any 
slowed RT represents a failure to “shift attention away” from the emotional content (the 
negative word) to the affectively-neutral content (the color of the word). 
 
The Metacognitive Model of PTSD 
 
The metacognitive model of PTSD (Wells, 2000) is based on the Self-Regulatory 
Executive Function model (S-REF Model: Wells & Matthews, 1994) which emphasizes 
the importance of attentional control in emotional disorders. According to the 
metacognitive model (Wells, 2000) intrusive thoughts are normal and necessary after 
trauma. They are a sign that an individual is attempting to emotionally process the trauma 
and adjust to the event in a way that enhances future coping. For most people this process 
(reflexive adaption process, RAP), continues uninterrupted and symptoms naturally 
subside. Intrusions persist and become problematic when this process is interrupted by a 
self-relevant style of thinking called the cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS). The CAS 
causes persistent threat related processing called “trauma lock” and is driven by erroneous 
beliefs about thinking (Wells, 2009).  
 
 The CAS in PTSD consists of: 1) worrying, rumination and „gap filling‟ (going 
over memory) 2) threat monitoring and 3) maladaptive coping strategies. Consistent with 
the model research indicates the use of worry as a strategy leads to an increase in intrusive 
thoughts (Wells & Davies, 1994; Roussis & Wells, 2006; 2008; Holeva, Tarrier & Wells, 
2001). A longitudinal study found rumination after stressful life events was associated with 
increased levels of subsequent stress symptoms and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). 
A recent study found that beliefs about trauma predicted PTSD symptoms while memory 
disorganisation, often believed to be significant in cognitive models of PTSD did not 
(Bennett & Wells, 2010). Attentional biases, such as threat monitoring (e.g. scanning the 
environment for signs of danger) are closely related to negative metacognitive beliefs (e.g. 
“If I look out for signs of danger I will be able to prevent another attack”). These strategies 
can block the down regulation of emotional processing and lead to an increase in intrusive 
thoughts (Wells, 2000). In accordance with this, it seems reasonable and likely that a 
technique that improves attentional control and reduces self-focused attention, 
characteristic of the CAS, would lead to a reduction in unwanted intrusions. 
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The Attentional Training Technique (ATT) 
 
The ATT (Wells, 1990) is an externally focused auditory exercise, used in 
metacognitive therapy. It was developed with the aim of treating the CAS by reducing self-
focus and directly modifying the control of attention. Training in this strategy following 
exposure to trauma, may make it easier for individuals to disrupt preservative processing 
(e.g. rumination, threat monitoring) allowing healthy emotional processing to take place 
and symptoms such as intrusive thoughts to subside. Specifically, when intrusions occur 
individuals are able to choose not to engage in the CAS thus ATT facilitates flexible 
control over processing. The ATT consists of three categories of auditory attentional 
exercises: (1) selective attention (focusing attention on individual sounds and spatial 
locations), (2) attention switching (rapidly shifting attention between different sounds and 
spatial locations and (3) divided attention (attending to as many simultaneous sounds and 
spatial locations as possible).  
 
The procedure is designed so that it consistently loads attention. Between 6 and 9 
sounds are typically introduced in combination with spatial locations. The aim is to follow 
the instructions irrespective of intrusive thoughts. They should be treated as additional 
noise, which are not given attentional priority. ATT should always be presented with a 
treatment rationale individually tailored to the specific disorder. This is important to 
facilitate understanding of the technique and enhance motivation for homework 
compliance. It should not be used as a coping strategy or as a form of distraction or 
avoidance of intrusive thoughts or emotion (Wells, 2009). 
 
Effectiveness of ATT 
 
A growing body of research supports the effectiveness of ATT for a range of 
emotional disorders including panic disorder (Wells, 1990; Wells, White & Carter, 1997), 
social phobia (Wells et al., 1997), hypochondrias (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1998; 
Canvanagh & Franklin, 2000), major depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2000), and the 
treatment of auditory hallucinations (Valmaggia, Bouman, & Schuurman, 2007). While it 
was originally designed as part of a treatment package these studies support its 
effectiveness as a stand-alone treatment approach. Clinically significant outcome measures 
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include significant reductions in symptoms and change in beliefs (e.g. Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2000), with treatment gains maintained at follow up (e.g. Canvanagh & Franklin, 
2000). A pilot study (Siegle, Ghinassi, and Thase, 2007) examined the neuropsychological 
effects of ATT on depressed patients, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
and reported changes in amygdala activity in the brain. 
 
To the authors‟ knowledge only one pilot study (Nassif & Wells, 2011) has 
explored the impact of ATT on traumatic stress symptoms.  Forty-two students were 
randomly assigned to two sessions of ATT or two sessions of a filler task. All participants 
had experienced a significantly stressful life event in the past which still caused distress. 
This event was narrated, recorded and then listened to. This constituted the stressful 
stimulus used in the experiment. This study aimed to examine the effects of ATT on: 1) the 
number of intrusions in a student population who had been exposed to a distressing life 
event 2) the effects of ATT on metacognitive processes assessed by the Detached 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (DMQ, Nassif, 2009) and 3) to use data as a basis for power 
calculations in future studies. Each participant was seen twice. The experimental group 
received two sessions of ATT and implemented one to two sessions for homework.  A 
significant reduction was found in number of intrusions in participants who received ATT 
in comparison to a control group. There were also significant between group differences on 
the metacognitive measure of attention flexibility. Attention flexibility increased 
significantly in the group that received ATT in comparison to the control group. Possible 
limitations of the study include the small sample which limits the power of the analyses. 
Furthermore, the sample tested was not clinical which means that results obtained cannot 
be generalized to PTSD sample. The study was also limited by the use of self-report 
measures and the length of time of the stressful narrative varied between participants. The 
present study attempted to improve on a number of these limitations. 
 
Current study 
 
The present study was designed to replicate and extend these findings by including 
a number of modifications: 1) A standardized measure of mood was included to further 
investigate the impact of ATT on negative affect 2) a computerized attention set shifting 
paradigm was included as an objective measure of attention flexibility, 3) length of time of 
the distressing narrative was controlled by imposing a time limit and 4) a larger sample 
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size was included, based on data from the pilot study, to increase the power of the 
analyses.  
 
It was expected that there would be a significant reduction in intrusions and 
negative affect in the group who received attention training in comparison to the control 
group. It was also hypothesized that there would be a significant increase in attention 
flexibility in the group who received attention training. It was expected that this change in 
attention flexibility would be evident in a task involving emotional attention set shifting 
(Johnson, 2009).  
 
Primary hypotheses: 
Participants who receive metacognitive training by ATT, in comparison to a control group 
will: 
 
1. Report a greater reduction in number of intrusions when exposed to reminders of 
their stressful life event. 
 
2. Report a greater reduction in negative affect when exposed to reminders of their 
stressful life event. 
 
3. Report a greater increase in self-report attention flexibility. 
  
Subsidiary hypotheses: 
 
4. ATT will lead to differences in attentional performance between groups. It is 
predicted that those who receive attentional training will show a greater change in 
emotional to neutral (EN) mental set switch cost for negative material in 
comparison to a control group. The impact of ATT on remaining switch cost 
scores is exploratory in nature. 
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Method  
Design 
 
This study used a mixed between within groups experimental design with one 
experimental group and one control group. The participants in each group were tested on 
two separate occasions. Principal statistical analyses included mixed between-within 
subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVAS) to compare groups on the dependent variables. 
Analyses of covariance (ANCOVAS) were used to control for these variables at the start of 
the experiment.  
 
Participants and setting 
 
Ethical approval was obtained from The University of Manchester School of 
Psychological Sciences Ethics Committee. The study was advertised on the university 
volunteer website. Ninety seven students from the University of Manchester completed the 
online screening questionnaire. When recruitment ceased 60 participants were utilised in 
the study. Inclusion criteria were: (1) The presence of a significantly stressful life event (2) 
The occurrence of intrusive thoughts in relation to the event (3) A distress rating of at least 
30%
4
 or more upon experiencing these intrusions (4) The stressful event had to have taken 
place at least a month before the experiment, to rule out the presence of acute stress 
disorder (ASD).  
 
The age of participants ranged from 18 to 28 years. Twelve were male (mean age = 
20.50, SD = 2.15) and 48 were female (mean age = 20.13, SD = 2.40). All participants 
were given the choice between receiving payment of £10 or 12 course credits for their 
participation. The stressful life events were clustered into 7 categories: Death of close 
family member/friend (10%), sexual assault (8.33%), physical assault (20%), motor 
vehicle accident (20%), unexpected illness (8.33%), accident/incident to self or other 
(18.33%) and a stressful period that resulted in a major change (15%). 
 
                                                 
4
 This score was sufficient in the pilot study (Nassif & Wells; 2011) and was introduced to 
avoid possible floor effects so that the impact of ATT could be observed on symptoms. 
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Materials and measures 
 
Attention Training Technique 
 
A recorded CD (Copyright, Wells 2007) presented ATT in a standardised way to 
participants in the experimental group. Duration of ATT was 12 minutes, excluding the 
instructions given prior to the technique. The sounds included clock, church bells, bird 
song, insects, traffic and running water. Participants were asked to listen to the CD during 
both sessions and twice for homework practice. A copy of the recording is available at 
www.mct-institute.com.  
 
Attention Filler Task 
 
Participants in the control group were presented with a set of pages, each with 
letters or numbers printed on them. They were instructed to cross out specified numbers or 
letters on each page and when finished to move onto the next. They were advised that they 
had 12 minutes to complete the task.  
 
The Attentional Control Capacity for Emotional Representations (ACCE) Task  
 
The ACCE Task (Johnson, 2009) was designed to measure one‟s ability to shift 
attention towards and away from emotional material.  Evidence suggests that individuals 
who are more efficient at shifting attention between tasks or inhibiting previous mental sets 
exhibit lower levels of rumination (Whitmer & Banich, 2007).  The task was presented on 
a computer and participants performed one of two judgments on a compound stimulus that 
consisted of a face with a shape centered between the eyes. For the emotional judgment 
they were to identify if the valence of the face was happy, angry or neutral. For the neutral 
judgment they were to identify the type of shape located between the eyes of the face, 
which could be a circle, square or triangle. Participants were instructed to use the number 
pad to make all responses, including the 1, 2, and 3 keys, using their index, middle, and 
ring fingers respectively. It was explained that all instructions would be given by the 
computer and participants were free to proceed on their own with the task. The task took 
25 – 30 minutes to complete. 
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There were 3 blocks of 15 practice trials (face practice, shape practice, and then 
combined). During the practice trials the participants received feedback in the form of 
“Correct”, “Incorrect” and “No response detected.” Each trial began with a cue presented 
on a computer screen. This cue was either a solid bar or a patterned bar that informed 
participants whether they needed to make an emotional or neutral judgment. The cue was 
presented for either 200 or 1,500 milliseconds and then replaced with a stimulus (a face 
with a shape between the eyes) on which the participant had to make a judgment. The face-
shape combination was presented until the participant responded or 5 seconds had lapsed. 
A solid bar served as a cue to the participant to attend and respond to the emotional 
expression of the face (emotional mental set), whereas a patterned bar cued the participant 
to attend and respond to the type of shape between the eyes of the face (neutral mental set). 
Stimuli were matched for valence and intensity.  After the practice trials, 5 blocks of test 
trials followed (85 trials each) with time to rest in between each block. The minimum rest 
period was 10 seconds. The participants no longer received feedback on their task 
performance.  
 
There was equal probability of emotion- emotion (EE) repetition trials, neutral-
neutral (NN) repetition trials, emotion-neutral (EN) switching trials, and neutral-emotion 
switching trials. There was equal probability of each of those occurring with each 
emotional expression (happy, angry, and neutral), so the probability of one of each of the 
12 trial types equals 8.3%. The cue-to stimulus interval was randomized (CSI) and the cue 
remained on screen throughout the CSI. Valence was not random.  It was repeated exactly 
6 times and then switched to the next valence. A median RT was created for each trial type 
for each subject.  So, it was not influenced by outliers.   
 
Two switch cost scores, EN switch cost and NE switch cost, were calculated for 
each valence. These were the dependent variables of interest. Switch costs were calculated 
by computing two difference scores. The median response time (RT) for the NN repetition 
trials was subtracted from the median RT for the EN switching trials to obtain individual 
differences in EN switch cost. The median response time (RT) for the EE repetition trials 
was subtracted from the median RT for the NE switching trials to obtain individual 
differences in NE switch cost. 
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The Impact of Events Scale (IES)  
 
The IES (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) is a 15 item measure and was 
included to assess current emotional distress related to the specific stressful life event. The 
responses cover the past seven days. It consists of two subscales Intrusions (7 items) and 
avoidance (8 items). Participants are required to respond to each question on a four point 
scale, ranging from „not at all‟ to „often‟, with scoring by assigning the values 0,1,3,5, to 
each of the frequency categories. The maximum possible total score for the IES is 75, with 
the maximum for avoidance being 40 and for intrusion 35. Split half reliability of the total 
scale is high (r = 0.86). Internal consistency of the subscales calculated using Cronbach‟s 
Alpha is high (Intrusions = 0.78, avoidance = 0.82).  
 
The Detached Mindfulness Questionnaire (DMQ)  
 
The DMQ (Nassif, 2009) was included to assess self-report attentional flexibility. 
The DMQ is a 22 item measure that consists of five theoretically derived constructs of 
detached mindfulness: Attention flexibility, Meta-Awareness, Detachment/ Observing Self, 
Thought Control, and Cognitive De-centering. It assesses participants‟ different levels of 
awareness and how they respond to their thoughts and requires participants to rate each 
item on a scale of 1-5 (1 = Disagree; 2 = Disagree to some extent; 3 = neither agree nor 
disagree; 4 = Agree to some extent; 5 = agree). The overall reliability co-efficient of this 
new measure, including the reliability of the Attention Flexibility Subscale has been 
reported as acceptable (Nassif, 2009; unpublished thesis). 
 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS).  
 
The PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a 20 item measure that 
comprises two mood scales, one measuring positive affect and the other measuring 
negative affect. Each item is rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = very slightly or not 
at all to 5 = extremely to indicate the extent to which the participant has felt in the 
indicated time frame, for example “Right now”. Watson et al. (1988) reported cronbach‟s 
alpha coefficients ranging from 0.86 to 0.80 for the Positive Affect Scale and 0.84 to 0.87 
for the Negative Affect Scale. Test-retest correlations for an 8 week period ranged from 
0.47 to 0.68 for the Positive Affect and 0.39 to 0.71 for negative affect. Validity of the 
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scale is reported: Measures of general distress and dysfunction, depression and state 
anxiety are more highly correlated with the negative affect scale (positive correlations) 
then the Positive Affect scale (Negative correlations).  
 
Self-Attention Rating Scale 
 
A 7 point, Self-Attention Rating Scale (Wells, 2000), was used to measure level 
and change in attention. This measure assesses the main focus of attention at the present 
time. Participants are asked to indicate whether they consider their attention to be “entirely 
externally focused” with a rating of -3, or their attention to be “entirely self-focused” with 
a rating of +3, or somewhere in the middle “equal amounts” with a rating of zero. A 
successful ATT session is shown by a shift of at least two points from self-focused 
attention to externally focused attention. 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
This was given to the experimental group only after ATT. This measure includes 
one question asking participants‟ to rate on a scale ranging from 0% (not at all) to 100% 
(Completely) how much were they able to engage with the technique when instructed. 
 
Procedure 
 
After meeting inclusion criteria, participants were then given a sign-in code which 
allowed them to select two different experimental time slots (two or three days apart). Each 
participant was seen twice, with an average of 2.42 days (SD = 1.33) between the two 
sessions. The experimental group received two sessions of ATT and was asked to practice 
ATT twice for homework practice. The control group completed the attention filler task 
instead. The first experimental session lasted 90 minutes and the second 75 minutes. 
 
Session 1 
 
All participants read the information sheet and gave their informed consent. They 
were randomly allocated via online software 
(http://www.graphpad.com/quickcalcs/randomize1.cfm) to either the experimental (ATT) 
or control (filler task) group. All participants completed the IES and DMQ at the beginning 
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of the session. They narrated their stressful event in accordance with Foa, Molnar and 
Cashman‟s instructions (1995), modified for the purpose of the experiment. They were 
asked to describe the event in the present tense, vividly, in as much detail as possible and 
to speak for a period of five minutes.  They were also asked to describe their thoughts, 
feelings, behaviors, surroundings and other people‟s actions, during the event. The start of 
the trauma narrative was defined as the first expression of threat. The experimenter 
signaled to them when the time was up. Participants were then asked to listen back to three 
minutes of their taped narrative. Immediately after the end of the listening period they were 
asked to record the number of intrusions they experienced while listening to their narrative. 
They were asked to complete the PANAS and rate how they felt “right now”. All 
participants were asked to complete the self-attention rating scale. Participants in the 
experimental group were briefly socialized to the MCT model of PTSD. The “healing 
metaphor” (Wells, 2009, p138) was used to explain persistence of symptoms and illustrate 
the role of the CAS (e.g. worrying and ruminating) in maintaining disorder. A rationale for 
ATT, specific to PTSD and instructions was also provided. Participants were then asked to 
complete three questions to check their understanding (e.g. what can you do to help change 
these thinking patterns and let these thoughts take care of themselves?”). This was to 
ensure that they understood the rationale behind the technique and to increase motivation 
for homework compliance. They then completed the first session of ATT which lasted 
approximately 12 minutes, and the control group received a filler task of similar duration. 
Upon completion of their task, all participants re-rated their focus of attention. All 
participants completed the ACCE Task for the first time. Participants in the experimental 
group were given a CD of ATT and instructed to practice the technique at least twice for 
homework. 
 
Session 2 
 
Participants were administered a Self-Attention Rating Scale at the beginning of the 
second session, before and after completion of their designated task. Participants in the 
experimental group completed another session of ATT and those in the control group 
completed another filler task.  Prior to commencing the session, participants in the 
experimental group were asked to indicate the number of ATT rehearsals they had 
completed for homework. They were also asked to rate how much they were able to 
engage with the task. All participants were re- administered the IES and the DMQ. They 
were again asked to listen to three minutes of their narrative and to record the number of 
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intrusions they experienced while listening. They also completed the PANAS and rated 
how they felt „right now‟ after listening to their narrative. Finally all participants were 
asked to complete the ACCE task again. All participants were debriefed and paid or 
awarded course credits. Information was provided to any participants who wished to seek 
further advice in relation to their traumatic experience. 
 
 Overview of Data Analysis  
 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is reasonably robust if group sizes are close to 
equal (Stevens, 1992). Analyses of covariance (ANCOVAS) were used in order to 
compare the effects of ATT on the variables specified by the hypotheses, while controlling 
for these variables at the start of the experiment. Mixed between-within subjects ANOVAS 
were also conducted to compare groups on the dependent variables. This analysis provided 
a test of whether there was a causal relationship between ATT and the intended outcomes. 
The results are summarized in Table 1. Finally Spearman‟s Rho correlations were used to 
examine significant associations between the observed change in intrusions, number of 
ATT sessions and change in attention flexibility.  
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Results  
Preliminary analyses 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 summarize an initial screen of the key 
dependent variables assessed in the study. All variables were normally distributed except 
for number of intrusions at time 1 and time 2 and negative affect at time 2. These variables 
were positively skewed and yielded positive kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistics. They were 
transformed
5
 accordingly using a logarithm to the base 10 statistic and subsequently the 
new variables were normally distributed. Overall there was only one missing value in the 
data. This was replaced with the group mean (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996). The data was 
screened for outliers. For each analysis preliminary checks were conducted to ensure that 
there was no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, homogeneity of 
variances, homogeneity of regression slopes, and reliable measurement of the covariate.  
 
For the intrusions and negative affect variables it was decided to retain the original 
values for the analyses, instead of the transformed scores. According to the Central Limit 
Theorem for group sizes of 30 or more, tests based on the normal distribution are still valid 
even when the data is not normally distributed (see Howell, 2002). A series of independent 
samples t-tests were conducted to ascertain whether there were any pre-existing differences 
between groups prior to experimental manipulation in order to highlight any variables that 
might need controlling as covariates. There were no significant differences found between 
groups at baseline except for two variables EN switch cost for „happy faces‟ and for „angry 
faces‟. Switch cost is length of time (in milliseconds) spent disengaging from an emotional 
mental set and reconfiguring to a neutral set. 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
Impact of Stressful Event 
 
As part of initial screening the level of distress found to be associated with intrusive 
thoughts ranged from 30% to 100%. An independent samples t-test was conducted to 
compare the level of distress in the experimental and control group. There was no 
significant difference in scores for the experimental group (M = 65.35, SD = 17.72) and 
                                                 
5 The data was re-analyzed using the transformed variables. This made no difference to 
statistical significance.  
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control group (M = 57.10, SD = 21.94) (t (58) = 1.60, p = 0.116, two-tailed). The 
magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = 8.25, 95% CI: -2.10 to 
18.59) was small to moderate (eta squared = 0.04) (Cohen, 1988). 
 
The average IES score at baseline for all participants was 30.27 (SD = 15.38, range 
= 5-71). A cut off point of 20 is generally used to indicate a moderate to severe impact of a 
traumatic event (Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, 1979). 66.7% of participants (n = 40) were 
above this cut off and 33.3% (n = 20) were below. A cut off score of 35 has been proposed 
for clinical diagnosis with an overall diagnostic efficiency of 88% relative to structured 
clinical interview (Neal, Busuttil, Rollins, Herepath, Strike, Turnbull. 1994). An 
independent samples t-test was conducted to compare initial scores between groups. There 
was no significant difference between the experimental group (M = 32.83, SD = 18.17) and 
the control group (M = 27.87, SD = 12.04) (t (58) = 1.24, p = 0.22, two-tailed). The 
magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference = 4.96, 95% CI: -3.10 to 
13.01) was small to moderate (eta squared = 0.026) (Cohen, 1988). 
 
Attention rating and compliance with ATT 
 
Based on data obtained from the self-attention rating scale ATT was largely 
successful in its aim of shifting participants‟ focus of attention from self-focus to external 
focus. In the ATT group (N = 29), all but three participants had a shift of at least two 
points toward external focus measured on the scale after they received the first session of 
ATT. Two of the remaining three participants indicated no change but they reported 60% 
and 70% compliance with the ATT session. The other participant reported a one point shift 
towards self-focused attention. This participant reported high compliance with the task 
with a rating of 70%. However further questioning revealed she had been focusing on what 
the experimenter thought of her during the technique. Compliance with the ATT in the 
experimental group ranged from 60 and 100 % in the first session (M = 75.17, SD = 11.53) 
and between 40 % and 100 % (M = 78.28, SD = 14.65) in the second session of ATT. On 
the second ATT session (N = 29), 26 people rated their attention as shifting externally, 
three people stayed the same and no-one reported a shift towards self-focused attention. 
For the three people who stayed the same two of these reported 60% compliance and one 
of them reported 80% compliance.  
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In the control group (N = 31), the pattern of self-focused attention seemed random. 
20 people indicated a shift towards external-focused attention, 4 reported no change and 7 
reported a shift toward internal attention on the first session. On the second session, 17 
people indicated a shift towards external-focused attention, four reported no change and 10 
reported a shift toward internal attention. The exact cognitive mechanisms that could have 
been involved were not examined. 
 
Intrusions 
 
As hypothesized the number of intrusions decreased more in the group that 
received ATT, when compared to the control group (see Fig 1). There was a 51.27% 
reduction in intrusions reported by the ATT group and only a 2 % reduction in intrusions 
reported by the control group from time 1 to time 2. A one-way between groups ANCOVA  
revealed that after adjusting for Time 1 scores there was a significant difference between 
the two groups on number of intrusions reported at Time 2, with a significantly lower 
number of intrusions experienced by those in the ATT group, F (1, 57) = 13.46 p < 0.001. 
The effect size was large, partial eta squared = 0.19 (Cohen, 1988). There was a strong 
relationship between number of intrusions recorded at Time 1 and Time 2, as indicated by 
a partial eta squared value of 0.34. A mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was also 
conducted to test for differences between groups (ATT and filler task) on the number of 
intrusions participants‟ reported across two time periods (Time 1 and Time 2) and for 
interactions between the factors group and time (i.e. whether one group changed more than 
the other). A significant interaction effect between group and time was found (see table 1). 
The effect size was large (Cohen, 1988). 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
 
Negative Affect 
 
As hypothesized, negative affect decreased more in the group that received ATT 
when compared to the control group. A one way between groups ANCOVA  revealed that 
after adjusting for Time 1 scores there was a significant difference between the two groups 
on negative affect reported at Time 2, with a significantly  lower negative affect 
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experienced by those in the ATT group, F( 1,57)  = 5.44, p < 0.05. The effect size was 
medium, partial eta squared = 0.09 (Cohen, 1988). There was a strong relationship between 
negative affect scores at Time 1 and Time 2, as indicated by a partial eta squared value of 
0.22. A mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was also conducted (see Table 1).  A 
significant interaction effect between group and time was reported. The effect size was 
large (Cohen, 1988). 
 
Attention Flexibility 
 
As hypothesized participants receiving ATT reported a greater change in Attention 
Flexibility (AF) measured by the DMQ when compared to a control group.  A one way 
between groups ANCOVA  revealed that after adjusting for Time 1 scores there was a 
significant difference between the two groups on Attention Flexibility reported at Time 2, 
F (1, 57) = 9.91, p = 0.05. The ATT group reported greater flexibility at time 2. The effect 
size was large, partial eta squared = 0.15 (Cohen, 1988). There was a strong relationship 
between AF scores at Time 1 and Time 2, as indicated by a partial eta squared value of 
0.61. A mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was also conducted (see Table 1). There 
was a significant interaction effect between group and time. The effect size was large 
(Cohen, 1988). 
 
 
Emotional Attention Switch Cost 
 
Switch costs were calculated by computing two difference scores (Johnson, 2009). 
Analyses used median reaction times (RTs) because mean RTs are not robust against 
outliers.  The RTs were for correct trials only. In addition, RTs for short cue to stimulus 
intervals were included, as the primary interest was in full switch cost, rather than residual 
switch cost. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
EN switch cost 
 
The median RT for neutral-neutral (NN) repetition trials was subtracted from the 
median RT for emotion-neutral (EN) switching trials to obtain individual differences in EN 
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switch cost. A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA was conducted on the EN switch cost data 
with one between group variable, Group (ATT, Control) and two within subject variables, 
Session (Time 1, Time 2) and Valence of stimuli (happy, angry and neutral). The Group x 
Time x Valence interaction effect was significant (F (2, 57) = 6.04, P<0.004).  
 
To elucidate this three way interaction, three separate mixed-design ANOVAS (see 
Fig 2.) were conducted for each type of Valence (happy, angry, and neutral). The design of 
these analyses was 2(Group; ATT, Control) x 2(Session; Time 1, Time 2). There was a 
significant interaction between session and group for happy and angry faces (See Table 1). 
For happy faces the ATT group showed a significant reduction in switch cost score and the 
control group showed an increase. Perhaps due to an increase in attention flexibility 
individuals who received ATT did not try and focus on happy faces and instead were able 
to focus on the task at hand, illustrated by their faster response times. For angry faces both 
groups showed a reduction in EN switch cost. The control group showed a significantly 
greater reduction in switch cost score than the ATT group (see Table 1). This may suggest 
that individuals who received ATT did not employ cognitive avoidance in of negative 
emotional stimuli. For neutral faces the main effect comparing the two types of group was 
non-significant (see Table 1). Both groups showed a significant reduction in switch cost 
(see Fig 2). 
 
NE switch cost 
 
The median RT for Emotion –Emotion (EE) repetition trials was subtracted from 
the median RT for NE switching trials to obtain individual differences in NE switch cost.  
A 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA was conducted on the NE switch cost data with one 
between group variable, Group (ATT, Control) and two within subject variables, Session 
(Time 1, Time 2) and Valence of stimuli (happy, angry and neutral). The Group x Time x 
Valence interaction effect was non-significant (F (2, 57) = 0.92, P> 0.05). Hence no further 
analyses were necessary. 
 
Relationship between changes in intrusions, change in attention flexibility and 
number of ATT sessions performed  
 
Spearman‟s Rho correlations were run in the two conditions separately in order to 
explore the relationship between the change in number of intrusions reported, change in 
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self- rating of attention, change in attention flexibility and (only in the ATT group) the 
number of ATT sessions each participant received (including homework). This non-
parametric test was chosen as the distribution of the variables was skewed for the newly 
computed change in intrusions variable and the change in self-rated attention variable, 
violating the assumptions of parametric testing. Change in the number of intrusions was 
computed by subtracting the number of intrusions reported at Time2 from those reported at 
Time 1. The same method was used to calculate the change in Attention Flexibility 
between the two sessions. Change in self-rated attention was calculated by subtracting the 
scores of participants given at the end of the training session, from the one obtained prior 
to manipulation. This was done for both sessions of training. The only significant 
association was between change in the number of intrusions and change in self-attention in 
the second session. There was a strong positive correlation (rho = .542, n = 29, p < 0.01) 
but only in the group that received ATT showing that as self-attention decreased the 
number of intrusions also decreased. 
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Discussion  
 
Key findings 
 
In support of hypothesis 1, the most striking feature of the data was the large 
reduction in intrusions reported by the group who received attention training in comparison 
to a control group. These findings are consistent with a previous study (Nassif & Wells, 
2011). Also in agreement with Nassif and Wells (2011) a positive association between the 
change in number of intrusions and change in self-focused attention after the second 
session was found. There is general consensus that a heightened degree of self-focus is 
characteristic of emotional disorders (Ingram, 1990). ATT appeared to facilitate a shift in 
self-rated attention from internal focus to external focus.  
 
In support of hypothesis 2, there was a significant reduction in negative affect 
reported by the attention training group in comparison with the control group. This is 
consistent with previous studies that have found that ATT resulted in a significant 
reduction in symptoms and an improvement in mood (e.g. Papageorgiou & Wells, 2000).  
 
In support of hypothesis 3, attention flexibility increased significantly in the ATT 
group, in comparison to a control group as measured by the DMQ. These findings support 
the theoretical basis of ATT based on the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 1994).  
 
Finally in support of hypothesis 4, there was a significant difference in EN switch 
cost between the groups for „angry faces‟. While both groups showed a reduction in EN 
switch cost for „angry faces‟, this change was significantly greater in the control group. 
This may indicate a reduction in emotional avoidance, a maladaptive coping strategy and 
feature of the CAS, targeted by ATT. For „happy faces‟, the ATT group showed a 
significant reduction in switch cost score and the control group showed an increase. No 
significant differences were found between groups in NE switch cost, which was included 
in analyses for exploratory purposes. So perhaps the control group maintained a strategy of 
focusing on positive stimuli (happy faces) and avoiding negative stimuli (angry faces) but 
the ATT group did not appear to show this emotional avoidance response because they 
may have been better able to process the trauma. Therefore they did not need to avoid 
negative emotional reminders of the event. 
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Theoretical Implications  
 
These findings support the theoretical basis of ATT. According to the S-REF model 
(Wells & Matthews, 1994) reduced attention flexibility and bias is a component of the 
CAS. ATT may work by making individuals‟ attention more flexible, which allows 
adaptive processing of the traumatic event (i.e. the RAP) and a reduction in symptoms. 
Individuals need attention flexibility for the regulation of extended thinking (e.g. worrying, 
rumination and switching out of threat mode of processing). Flexible control over thinking 
allows individuals to relate to their thoughts differently and this metacognitive flexibility 
„frees up‟ their capacity to attend to other stimuli. Previous studies (e.g. Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) found that worry and rumination can lead to 
a greater number of intrusive thoughts hence it seems likely that a technique that reduced 
these processes would lead to a reduction in intrusions and an overall improvement in 
affect.  These findings provide further support for the metacognitive model of PTSD 
(Wells & Sambi, 2004a).  
 
In addition to an increase in self-reported attention flexibility, measured by the 
DMQ, ATT also appears to have demonstrated changes in attentional performance on an 
objective measure, the ACCE task (Johnson, 2009). Emotional to neutral switch cost in 
response to „angry faces‟ was significantly faster in the control group who had not received 
ATT. Avoidance of negative material would be objectively indicated by a faster emotion to 
neutral switch cost for angry faces. Consistent with this finding evidence suggests that 
individuals high on anxiety may avoid attention to emotional imagery (e.g. Borkovec, 
Alcaine, & Behar, 2004). Studies have reported attentional bias away from threatening 
faces in highly anxious individuals (e.g. Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999; Mogg, 
Bradley, Miles & Dixon, 2004). However this is inconsistent with literature suggesting that 
individuals higher in anxiety selectively deploy attention toward negative emotional 
stimuli (e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001).  Observed 
effects may be dependent on the type of stimuli used and whether state or trait effects of 
emotion are tested (Wells & Matthews, 1994). 
 
One possible explanation is that ATT reduced the degree to which participants tried 
to avoid negative material, to regulate their symptoms and mood. It seems plausible that 
attentional training may have reduced emotional avoidance of negative material, indicative 
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that participants had processed their negative emotion in a healthy manner, instead of 
repeatedly and intentionally avoiding it. Emotional avoidance is counterproductive, for 
example thought suppression leads to more intrusions and greater accessibility of negative 
material (S-Ref Model; Wells & Mathews, 1994; Wegner, 1994).  
 
For „happy faces‟, the control group was significantly slower to switch from an 
emotional to neutral judgment, than those who had been trained in flexible attentional 
control. Perhaps the control group, who experienced significantly more intrusions and 
greater negative affect, were attempting to regulate their emotion using an “avoidance” 
attentional deployment strategy (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Both groups improved equally 
on EN switch cost, for „neutral faces‟ highlighting the importance of looking at valence-
specific set-shifting.  No significant results were evident for the NE switch cost scores, 
which was included as an exploratory analysis.  
 
However these findings should be interpreted with caution as the ACCE task is a 
relatively new task and similar to other tasks of attentional performance, the mechanisms 
comprising and mediating the attentional biases demonstrated remain unclear. Future 
research, strongly driven by theory, is needed to further understand the attentional 
processes involved.  
 
Possible neuropsychological mechanisms underpinning the effectiveness of ATT 
should also be investigated through methods such as fMRI and electroencephalography 
(EEG). One may expect participants who had received ATT to show changes in cortical 
activity, indicative of strategic and spatial processing of attention and metacognition 
(Wells, 2009). 
 
Limitations 
 
There are differences between the groups apart from the ATT which may be 
responsible for the results of the experiment.  It is possible that expectancy effects, arising 
from the disorder specific treatment rationale administered as part of the ATT intervention, 
may be responsible for the reduction in symptoms. Future research could control for this 
by dismantling the treatment to see which components of intervention were most effective. 
Another difference was that the ATT group was asked to complete homework while the 
control group was not. This may have introduced practice effects impacting on the 
outcome variables. This could be controlled for by including conditions that include non- 
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specific factors (e.g. homework of a specific kind). It is also possible that demand 
characteristics may have impacted on outcome variables. Participants may have attempted 
to conform to the experimenters expectations. 
 
The current sample involved a non-clinical sample; hence results cannot be 
generalized to a PTSD population. However, the inclusion of the IES indicated that over 
two thirds of participants were above the cutoff point of 20 which indicates a moderate to 
severe impact of a traumatic event (Horowitz et al., 1979).  
 
A further limitation of this study was that no follow up data was collected. Data 
from other studies suggests that effects of ATT are maintained up to 12 months follow up 
(e.g. Wells, 1990; Wells et al. 1997) however this would need to be further investigated in 
the present context.  
 
It is important to note the possibility of increased likelihood of type 1 error, due to 
the number of statistical analyses carried out. Perhaps the P-values should have been 
Bonferroni adjusted. However Perneger (1998) argues that such adjustments are 
unnecessary. Finally the switch cost scores at Time 1 also differed between groups for EN 
switch cost for „happy‟ and „angry‟ faces which may bias results and so analyses should be 
interpreted with caution. There may have been pre-experimental differences on the ACCE 
task that randomization did not eliminate. These differences may also have been due to 
order effects as the ACCE task was first administered after the first session of ATT. Future 
research should consider applying the ACCE task before the intervention as well as after.  
 
Clinical Implications 
 
Whilst recognizing that the current study involved a non-clinical sample it provides 
preliminary empirical support for the use of ATT, in the treatment of traumatic stress 
symptoms. It should be noted however, that ATT was not intended to be a stand-alone 
treatment technique. 
 
It is unknown how long lasting effects of ATT are in trauma victims or how many 
sessions of ATT are required in order to see a clinically significant change in stress 
symptoms. Similar to the previous study (Nassif & Wells, 2011) three to four sessions 
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appeared sufficient in reducing traumatic stress symptoms. The duration of effects in 
trauma victims should be assessed in future studies.  
 
The findings of the present study are important in terms of contributing to the 
growing evidence base of the effectiveness of ATT and may be important in terms of the 
empirical evidence base for trauma related interventions. Future research should examine 
the impact of ATT on traumatic stress symptoms in a clinical population using 
standardized and objective measures of symptoms, attention and metacognition.  
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Note: RT (ms) = median response time in milliseconds, A = ATT group, C = Control group, WL = Wilks Lambda, Partial η2 = Partial Eta Squared, *p < .05; ** p < .01,  
Dependent Variables 
 TIME 1 TIME 2 Group x Time Interaction 
    
 Mean SD Range Mean SD Range WL F (1,58) P-Value Partial 
η2 
No. of intrusions 
A 7.86 5.55 (1-25) 3.84 2.06 (0-8) 
0.85 10.19 0.002** 0.15 
C 6.97 5.80 (2-25) 6.84 5.75 (1-25) 
Negative affect 
A 23.86 7.17 (11-36) 16.59 6.91 (9-36) 
0.90 6.83 0.011* 0.11 
C 21.76 7.20 (12-39) 19.35 6.35 (12-37) 
Attention flexibility 
A 13.80 4.02 (6-21) 16.14 3.71 (9-23) 
0.91 5.60 0.021* 0.09 
C 13.09 4.88 (5-25) 13.71 3.90 (6-21) 
EN Switch Cost     Happy 
RT (ms) 
A 409.04 319.67 (-215 -1030) 220.75 182.02 (-47.80 – 657) 
0.88 7.66 0.008** 0.12 
C 227.52 352.45 (-430 – 939) 296.69 268.64 (5 -923) 
EN Switch Cost     Angry 
RT (ms)       
A 387.34 249.70 (79 -809) 265.91 181.90 (-7 – 676) 
0.89 6.80 0.012* 0.11 
C 517.98 217.80 (60 – 952) 198.23 184.56 (-46 –657) 
EN Switch Cost     Neutral 
RT (ms) 
A 656.09 314.07 (57 – 1516) 385.68 258.01 (-87 -1075) 
0.99 0.35 0.559 0.01 
C 637.00 398.30 (-65 – 1540) 309.51 225.89 (32-820) 
NE Switch Cost     Happy 
RT (ms) 
A 509.00 198.83 (-67 – 897) 538.78 176.95 (102-728) 
- - - - 
C 631.67 282.21 (107-1282) 227.52 352.45 (-74 – 1068) 
NE Switch Cost      Angry 
RT (ms)      
A 538.78 176.95 (107 – 1179) 342.76 234.05 (-262 – 879) 
- - - - 
C 467.73 343.18 (-396 – 1136) 662.60 348.40 (133 – 723) 
NE Switch Cost     Neutral 
RT (ms)          
A 629.43 405.09 (-444 – 1815) 440.84 199.98 (-9.50 – 828) 
- - - - 
C 342.93 210.80 (69 – 1723) 591.32 399.59 (15 – 1641) 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
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Figure 1. Change in mean number of intrusions within and across the two groups. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Change in Emotion - Neutral (EN) switch cost between groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Happy Angry Neutral 
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 Overview 
This section will highlight methodological and clinical issues, which merit 
recognition and discussion in the context of the present research. The first section will 
reflect on methodological and ethical issues raised throughout the research process. The 
second section will focus on theoretical and clinical considerations related to this study. 
Finally the limitations of this research study and suggestions for future research shall be 
discussed.    
 
 
Methodological & Ethical Considerations 
 
Design 
 
A mixed between-within subjects design was employed. The advantage of such a 
design is that it allows for comparison between treatment groups and within groups over 
time. This type of analysis can test whether there is a causal relationship between the 
independent variable, random assignment to groups (attention training or filler task), and 
the intended outcomes (a reduction in intrusions and negative affect, change in objective 
attention performance). 
 
Recruitment 
 
It was decided to recruit an analogue sample from the University of Manchester for 
a number of reasons. The impact of the Attentional Training Technique (ATT) on 
traumatic stress symptoms has only been evaluated in one previous study (Nassif & Wells, 
2011). It is considered good practice to establish treatment efficacy in an analogue sample 
before attempting replication with a clinical population (Chambless & Hollon, 1998). 
Relevant literature (e.g. Breslau, Davis, Andreski, & Peterson, 1991)   indicates that high 
numbers of students have been exposed to a stressful life event making them an 
appropriate sample in the current research context. Furthermore, stress symptoms are 
commonly occurring events and there maybe few differences in the nature of acute stress 
symptoms and those found in PTSD. 
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The researcher was reasonably confident about accessing a large enough sample for 
the study that satisfied the inclusion criteria. A previous study (Nassif & Wells, 2011) 
employed similar inclusion criteria and reported no difficulties with recruitment. Breslau, 
et al. (1991) studied a random sample of adults between the ages of 21 – 30 years and 
reported that 39% had been exposed to at least one event that would fit the DSM-III-R 
criteria (American Psychological Association, 1987) for PTSD. Vrana and Lauterbach 
(1994) also studied a healthy college population and found that 84% of respondents 
reported at least one event of sufficient intensity potentially to elicit PTSD.  
 
Psychology students at the university are required to earn a certain amount of 
course credits through a voluntary participation scheme operated by the University which 
provides an incentive to take part. Another advantage of using students is that they 
generally have more free time than a working population. Time was a consideration as the 
study involved meeting with participants twice, for up to an hour and a half, within two to 
three days. Recruitment slowed as expected around exam time, however overall no 
significant difficulties were encountered. All participants completed both parts of the 
study.   
 
Sample size 
 
A sample size of 60 was considered sufficient to conduct parametric analyses. 
Power calculations were based on change scores between two groups (ATT & control) 
derived from a previous study (Nassif & Wells, 2011). For number of intrusions, it was 
estimated that 17 participants would be required per group (34 in total) to yield 80% power 
at p = 0.05 (based on a simple t-test of the changes with estimated SD of change of 1.8). 
For attention flexibility it was estimated that 19 participants (38 in total) would be required 
per group to yield 80% power at p = 0.05 (based on a simple t-test of the changes with 
estimated SD of change of 2.5). It was decided to include a larger sample because of the 
more exploratory nature of one dimension of the study as data was unavailable for 
estimates of change scores for negative affect and emotional to neutral switch cost.  
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Measures 
 
All the measures used in the study are available for viewing (Appendix C). They 
were administered to each participant in the same order to ensure they underwent the same 
procedure. The principal hypothesis related to the number of intrusions experienced by 
participants after listening to their stressful narrative. The length of narrative was 
controlled for by imposing a time limit of three minutes. However it is difficult to ascertain 
how long individual intrusions may have lasted. It would have been interesting to ask 
participants what percentage of listening time had been occupied by intrusions. 
 
The Impact of Events Scale (IES) (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) was 
administered as a descriptive measure to describe the impact of the traumatic event on the 
participants. The IES was not intended for use in the primary analyses, as it is 
predominantly used with clinical populations. This measure has however been found to be 
sensitive to PTSD symptoms in student populations (Roussis & Wells, 2006).  It was 
selected instead of the IES-R (Weiss, & Marmar, 1996) as little has been published on the 
psychometric properties and construct validity of this scale (Creamer, Bell, & Failla, 
2003). Also for comparison purposes, the IES is a more widely used measure (Joseph, 
2000). However, the utility of the IES has been questioned as it is not based on DSM-IV 
criteria and does not assess symptoms of hyperarousal (Joseph, 2000). 
 
Both scales of the The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) were administered even though only scores obtained from the 
Negative Affect Scale were included in the analyses. Although not included in the initial 
hypotheses there appears to have been an increase in positive affect in the group that 
received attention training as evident from the descriptive statistics (Appendix D). 
 
Scores were also obtained for all five subscales of the Detached Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (DMQ) (Nassif, 2009) even though Attention Flexibility was the only 
subscale included in the analyses. Descriptive statistics of the other subscales: Detachment, 
Meta-awareness, Thought Control and Cognitive Decentreing are available (Appendix D). 
The DMQ is a relatively new measure and although it has demonstrated „acceptable fit‟ for 
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repeated administrations it would be beneficial to establish an optimal time period. The 
current study averaged 2 – 3 days, which seemed to be adequate for detecting change in 
attention performance.  
 
The inclusion of an objective measure of attention performance was a considerable 
strength of the study that was not included in the pilot study (Nassif &Wells, 2011). 
Originally the researcher considered investigating the impact of ATT using the attentional 
subscales of a computerised Neurocognitive test called CNS Vital Signs. These included a 
Stroop Task, a Shifting Attention Task (SAT) and a Continuous Performance Task (CPT). 
As little is known about the impact of ATT on neurocognitive status this hypothesis would 
also have been exploratory in nature. However it was decided to use the Attentional 
Control Capacity for Emotions Task (Johnson, 2009). This emotional attention set shifting 
paradigm was considered more sensitive to detect change, due to the specific nature of the 
task and the relatively brief intervention (3 – 4 sessions of ATT).  
 
The researcher considered the possibility of applying for a small imaging grant with 
the view of scanning a subset of participants, to investigate whether any 
neuropsychological changes could be detected in the ATT group. The university ethics 
committee advised against the imaging procedure due to time and financial constraints.  
 
Procedure 
 
The procedure was designed so that each participant underwent the same protocol 
within each group. Overall the procedure was adhered to. Length of time between sessions 
was generally two to three days. On a few occasions the experimenter had to reschedule 
the second part of the experiment due to unforeseen events on behalf of the participant 
(e.g. illness). Some participants struggled to speak in the present tense and slipped into the 
past when narrating their stressful narrative. Participants appeared to engage well with the 
ATT task and understood the rationale behind it, as evident from „the socialization to the 
model check‟ that was included in the study (Appendix E). Although the researcher 
checked homework compliance at the start of session 2, there is no further guarantee that 
participants practiced the technique as instructed.  
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Analyses 
 
Parametric tests were used to examine the data pertaining to the main hypotheses. 
These were considered appropriate due to the number of participants and nature of the 
data. Analyses utilizing Emotional to Neutral switch cost scores should be interpreted with 
caution as scores at Time 1 differed significantly between groups, which could bias results.  
 
Ethical Issues 
 
This study was approved by the University of Manchester, Division of Clinical 
Psychology (Appendix F). Ethical approval was also received from the School of 
Psychological Sciences Ethics Committee. Due to the nature of the study, concern was 
raised at one of the committee meetings, about participants‟ emotional well-being as the 
study involved speaking about a stressful life event. It was agreed that if a participant 
became upset during testing, the experimenter would handle the situation sensitively and 
suggest contacting their GP or the university counselling services if appropriate. The 
university counselling service had approved this arrangement prior to testing. It is worth 
mentioning that several research projects at Manchester University had used Foa, Molnar 
and Cashman‟s (1995) method of recording a stressful narrative and the distress it could 
cause was considered fleeting. 
 
All participants were given detailed information about the study before they took 
part (Appendix G) and signed a consent form (Appendix H). They were fully debriefed at 
the end of the study. They were reminded that they were free to withdraw their 
participation at any time. The researcher considered offering ATT to participants in the 
control group. However this would have been too difficult to implement within the time 
constraints of the study and competing demands of clinical training. All participants 
completed the study and while further information was provided on a number of occasions 
no-one became unduly distressed or withdrew from the study.  
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Dual Role 
 
A further consideration was the researcher‟s ethical position as a trainee clinical 
psychologist. Clinical researchers are encouraged to adhere to ethical guidelines including 
autonomy, beneficence and justice (Kitchener, 2000). The researcher felt confident that 
these were adhered to throughout the entire research process. The study involved listening 
to participants describe their stressful events that ranged in severity, from exam stress to 
sexual assault.  The discomfort associated with these events was an essential requirement 
of the study in order to assess the impact of ATT on traumatic stress symptoms. However 
at times it felt mildly uncomfortable, as the researcher‟s clinical role on placement 
involved working therapeutically with clients to alleviate their symptoms. It would have 
been inappropriate to slip from the role of „researcher‟ into the role of „therapist‟ and this 
would have potentially confounded results. It was important to follow the research protocol 
to ensure the reliability and validity of results. Clinical supervision was a useful outlet to 
discuss and reflect on such experiences.  
 
Theoretical Implications  
 
Present findings are consistent with predictions based on the metacognitive model 
of PTSD (Wells, 2000). According to this model, metacognitive treatment techniques such 
as ATT interrupt and reduce the CAS (i.e. unhelpful responding to intrusive thoughts) 
which results in a reduction in symptoms. Other theoretical models of PTSD, such as the 
Emotional Processing Theory (EPT; Foa, & Riggs, 1993) might struggle to explain how 
ATT could produce such a significant reduction in intrusive thoughts and negative affect, 
in such a short time frame (2-3 days).They maintain that prolonged exposure is necessary 
to activate the fear networks and allow distress to subside via habituation. Cognitive 
theories (e.g. Ehlers & Clarke, 2000; Brewin, Dalgeish, & Joseph, 1996) indicate that more 
time would be necessary to integrate the trauma memory in order to significantly reduce 
intrusive thoughts and negative affect.  
 
According to the S-REF Model (Wells & Matthews, 1994) ATT works by making 
individuals‟ attention become more flexible, this permits healthy emotional processing of 
the traumatic event and a reduction in symptoms. Attention flexibility increased 
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significantly in the ATT group which supports the theoretical basis of ATT. According to 
the S-REF model lack of attention flexibility is a marker of the CAS. Patients need to 
strengthen attentional flexibility for the regulation of extended thinking (e.g. worrying) and 
a reduction in maladaptive coping strategies such as emotional avoidance (e.g. thought 
suppression).  
 
ATT appears to be effective by reducing self-focused attention, as measured by the 
self-attention rating scale, restoring flexible control over thinking and detachment from 
thoughts. This would also account for the significant decrease in negative affect reported 
by those in the ATT group. These results make sense in terms of the S-REF model which 
maintains that engaging in prolonged preservative thinking and threat monitoring i.e. The 
CAS has a negative impact on mood and prolongs symptoms. The positive association 
between change in number of intrusions and change in self-focused attention after session 
two may indicate that practice is necessary to implement the technique effectively.  
 
 
Clinical Implications 
 
The need for briefer more effective treatments for PTSD has been identified (Kilic, 
2001). To date cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) including exposure therapy (ET) and 
cognitive restructuring (CR) is the most widely studied treatment for PTSD in the literature 
(Rothbaum, Meadows, Resick & Foy, 2000). Although dropout rates vary in the research 
literature they have been estimated to be as high as 43% (Power, McGoldrick, Brown, 
Buchanan, Sharp, et al., 2002). Some researchers have suggested that ET can lead to 
symptom exacerbation and contribute to high dropout rates (Pitman Altman, Greenweald, 
Longpie, Macklin, et al., 1991; Tarrier, Pilgrim, Sommerfield, Faragher, Reynolds, et al. 
1999). However, Feeny, Hembree and Zoellber (2003) argue that drop rates are no higher 
for ET than for other forms of CBT. Becker, Zayfert, and Anderson (2004) surveyed a 
sample of 207 psychologists and reported only 17% used imaginal ET in the treatment of 
PTSD. This indicates that perhaps its acceptability is questionable for many therapists.  
Similarly high dropout rates have been reported for treatments other than CBT such as 
group psychotherapy (Fisher, Winne, & Ley, 1993) and a combination of medication and 
supportive psychotherapy (Burstein, 1986).  
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Metacognitive therapy for PTSD has shown impressive results over a relatively 
short period of time (e.g. Wells, Welford, Fraser, King, Mendel, et al., 2008). 
Metacognitive techniques such as ATT appear to target metacognitive beliefs and negative 
affect associated with intrusions without treating emotion directly. Such techniques maybe 
important for individuals who cannot tolerate the initial distress and increase in symptoms 
associated with techniques such as exposure and drop out of therapy.  
 
Whilst recognizing that the current study involved an analogue sample it provides 
preliminary empirical support for the use of ATT, as a stand-alone technique in the 
treatment of traumatic stress symptoms. As little as three to four sessions showed a 
significant between groups difference, consistent with previous findings (Nassif & Wells, 
2011).  
 
Socialization to the Model of PTSD and a rationale for ATT treatment, tailored 
specifically to PTSD, were important for enhancing motivation and compliance. Without 
these essential components of the ATT package, treatment may not have been as effective. 
It is unknown how long lasting effects of ATT are in trauma victims or how many sessions 
of ATT are required in order to see a clinically meaningful change in stress symptoms. 
Similar to the previous study (Nassif & Wells, 2011) three to four sessions appeared 
sufficient at reducing traumatic stress symptoms. Other studies have reported lasting 
effects; with symptom reduction maintained at 18 months follow up (Cavanagh & 
Franklin, 2000) in hypochondrias patients. 
 
The finding that number of intrusions increased for two participants indicates that 
for some people ATT may exacerbate symptoms. An increase in intrusions may be 
accounted for by unhealthy emotionally processing or a RAP that is currently active 
(Nassif, 2009). It was not possible to establish whether either of these two processes was 
responsible for this effect. It is possible that some participants did not engage fully with the 
technique due to fatigue, which may impact on motivation. This was reported by one 
participant who had celebrated her birthday the previous night.  
 
Limitations of the study 
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              A number of limitations have been identified within the study such as the nature 
of the stressful event, sample accessed, the design and the materials which restrict the 
interpretations and implications of the findings. 
 
Stressful event 
 
The type of stressor varied greatly among participants (Appendix I). The current 
study drew upon life events that people had already experienced, as opposed to attempting 
to induce stress symptoms in an artificial setting, improving the validity of findings. 
Length of time passed since the event also varied amongst participants with some events 
occurring years ago and others just a couple of months. Some of the events involved direct 
threat to self while others involved witnessing others. Such variability means we cannot 
draw firm conclusions about the types of stressor that may respond best of worst to ATT. 
 
Sample 
 
 This study utilized an analogue sample and therefore results should be interpreted 
with caution and may not be generalized to a clinical population. However inclusion of the 
IES showed that two thirds of the sample (n = 40) scored at or above the cut-off of 20 
(Horowitz, et al., 1979) which indicates that they were moderately to severely impacted by 
their traumatic event. This suggests that ATT may also show beneficial results if used in 
the treatment of patients with PTSD.  
 
 The sample consisted of undergraduate and postgraduate students from a restricted 
age range and from a middle class background. Results should be interpreted in this 
context as they may not necessarily provide a true representation of the general population 
with regard to age and IQ. The sample was largely females (n = 48). Previous literature 
suggests that rates of PTSD are higher in females than males (Kessler et al., 1995). Gender 
differences may exist in the extent to which ATT moderates the relationship between 
attention flexibility and traumatic stress symptoms. 
 
 It was assumed due to the nature of the population that they were free from any 
major psychiatric illness. Perhaps participants should have been screened in advance as it 
likely that the presence of emotional disorders such as obsessive compulsive disorder or 
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generalised anxiety disorder may have influenced the number of intrusions and negative 
affect levels reported.  
 
 Another limitation worthy of comment is that these participants were recruited via 
self-selection sampling, in response to adverts on the university volunteer website or 
posters displayed around the university (Appendix J). They were selected from their 
responses obtained online. They were also offered an incentive in the form of 10 pounds or 
12 course credits for taking part. This may bias selection and introduce demand 
characteristics (e.g. social desirability effects) that could potentially influence outcome.  
 
Methodological issues 
 
It is important to consider alternative explanations for the results obtained. There 
are differences between the groups apart from the ATT intervention. Significant between 
groups‟ differences may have been influenced by expectancy effects. The experimental 
group was socialized to the metacognitive model of PTSD and received a disorder specific 
rationale explaining how ATT could lead to a reduction in symptoms. The control group 
received no socialization to the metacognitive model or rationale.  It is possible that this 
part of the ATT package may have contributed to the reduction in symptoms seen in the 
experimental group, as the ATT group expected to receive an effective treatment 
intervention. However, the aim of the present study was first to establish whether the 
complete ATT package impacted on traumatic stress symptoms. Future research could 
subsequently investigate which components of the ATT package are most effective. In 
addition to expectancy effects there may have been demand characteristics, the participants 
may have given the answers they thought the experimenter wanted. Other non-specific 
factors such as asking participants in the ATT group to complete homework may have 
impacted on the outcome variables. The control group was not instructed to complete the 
attention filler task for homework. It is possible that practice effects may have impacted on 
between group differences. Future research could control for this by instructing the control 
group to practice the attention filler task for homework. 
  
Measures 
 
A number of potential predisposing and maintaining factors relevant to traumatic 
stress symptoms were not measured such as previous trauma and history of mental health 
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problems (Ozner, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss 2003). Pre-trauma measures of intelligence (IQ) 
have also been identified as a predictor of PTSD (Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000) It is 
currently unclear to what extent intellectual functioning might moderate the impact of ATT 
on traumatic stress symptoms. Evidence also suggests that PTSD symptoms and depression 
scores are positively related to the number of events the person has experienced, 
particularly in women (Vrana & Lauterbach, 1994). These potentially confounding 
variables may have impacted on the variables of interest, such as number of intrusions 
experienced while listening to the narrative.  
 
Most of the measures included in the study were based solely on self -report, with 
the exception of attention flexibility. These measures may be subject to response bias. The 
inclusion of psychophysiological measures such as cardiovascular reactivity, cortisol 
levels, or skin conductance would have been an addition to the study.  
 
The DMQ is a new measure and its sensitivity to change is not well known. 
However it has been found to show consistently strong negative relationships with 
measures of pathology including the Penn State Worry questionnaire and the STAI Self 
Evaluation Questionnaire (Nassif, 2009).  
 
The ACCE Task 
 
The ACCE task was first administered at the end of session one after the first 
session of ATT or attention filler task had been administered and again at the end of 
session two. Due to the sequencing of tasks a true baseline measure of attentional 
performance, measured by the ACCE task, may not have been obtained. This may account 
for the between groups differences between groups at time 1, which limits the 
interpretation of these results. The reason it was not administered at baseline, before the 
ATT or attention filler task in session one, was that it also involves attentional processes, 
and may have led to order effects, confounding results of the primary hypotheses. Future 
research should consider applying the ACCE task at baseline, before the intervention, as 
well as after. There may also have been pre experimental differences that randomization 
did not eliminate.  
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Participants should have been screened for visual impairment as this could have 
influenced performance on the task (Johnson, 2009). Only those with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision should have been included. 
 
 
The ATT CD 
 
The standardized audio version of the ATT task was included in this study. This 
may exert different effects than the “live” version which is designed to increase sounds and 
spatial locations and to consistently load attention. However this standardized version 
ensured that participants had the same intervention and reduced the risk of possible 
confounding variables. The standardized version was used in an earlier study (Nassif & 
Wells, 2011). 
 
Implications for Future Research  
 
 Data from this study and the pilot study (Nassif & Wells, 2011) suggest that ATT 
has beneficial effects on traumatic stress symptoms. The next step is to investigate the 
impact of ATT as a stand-alone treatment with a clinical sample. To verify the validity of 
the findings and their relevance to the study of PTSD the current study should be replicated 
in a clinical sample that have experienced a range of traumatic events using a randomised 
controlled design or an established case methodology. The duration of effects in trauma 
victims should be assessed in future studies, by re-assessing participants at follow up 
sessions.   
 
To the author‟s knowledge it is the first time that ATT has shown a change in an 
objective attention set shifting task. The ACCE task is a relatively new task and hence 
findings should be interpreted with caution. Future research is necessary to understand the 
attentional processes involved. This finding should be replicated in future studies.  Perhaps 
an adapted form of the ACCE task, specifically designed for a PTSD population should be 
developed.  
 
Now that ATT has shown an improvement on an objective measure, possible 
neuropsychological mechanisms underpinning the effectiveness of ATT should also be 
investigated through methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
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electroencephalography (EEG). One may expect participants who had received ATT to 
show changes in pre-frontal cortex or spatial processing regions, indicative of strategic 
processing of attention (Wells, 2009). 
 
The findings of the present study are important in terms of contributing to the 
growing evidence base of the effectiveness of ATT and maybe important in terms of the 
empirical evidence base for trauma related interventions. Future research should examine 
the impact of ATT in patients diagnosed with PTSD using a standardized measure of 
intrusions.  
 
As two participants reported an increase in intrusive thoughts future investigation 
into the differential effects of ATT would be an appropriate avenue for future work. ATT 
may also be useful as a preventative technique in terms of strengthening attentional control 
in individuals vulnerable to psychopathology e.g. soldiers going to combat. This may be 
tested using a between subjects longitudinal design. 
 
Summary 
 
The first part of this section comprised an overview of the methodological and 
ethical considerations encountered during the research process. Overall the researcher is 
confident that the study is a credible piece of quantitative research that may have important 
implications for the theory and treatment of traumatic stress symptoms. A series of 
important theoretical and clinical implications were discussed that have emerged as a result 
of this research study. Limitations of the study have been reflected upon and suggestions 
made for the future indicating that there is much scope for future research in the area. To 
conclude whilst it is acknowledged that the present study is preliminary in nature it is 
believed that it can provide useful insights into the role of attentional processes in the 
development and treatment of traumatic stress symptoms and provide a basis for studies in 
the future.  
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Appendix C: Measures & Scales 
 
 
The Impact of Events Scale (IES) 
 
The Detached Mindfulness Questionnaire (DMQ) and Scoring Key 
 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
 
Intrusions Record 
 
Self-Attention Rating Scale 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
Attention Filler Task 
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The Impact of Events Scale (IES) 
 
Horowitz M, Wilner N, Alvarez W. (1979). Impact of Event Scale: a measure of subjective 
stress. Psychosomatic Medicine. 41(3):209-18. 
 
In order to protect copyright this measure has not been electronically submitted. A loose 
copy is available with the hardbound version of the thesis. 
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DMQ 
(Nassif 2009) 
 
People have different levels of awareness and reaction to their own thoughts. Below is a 
list of items examining how you view your thoughts and how you react to them.  
Please indicate the number that best reflects how much you agree or disagree. There are 
no right or wrong answers.  
 
 
 Disagree  Disagree 
to some 
extent 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree to 
some 
extent 
Agree 
1. I am aware that many of my thoughts are 
simply opinions rather than facts 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
2. I have no problem shifting attention away 
from my feelings 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
3. I usually know what I’m thinking about if 
someone asks me 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
4. I am able to have a negative thought 
without worrying about it 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
5. I can usually let go of my thoughts even if 
I’m worried 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
6. I can step back from my thoughts and see 
them as separate from me 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
7. I am able to understand that what I worry 
about is not necessarily going to happen 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
8. I usually know when my thoughts don’t 
mean anything 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
9. I can have a sense of myself which is 
distinct from my thoughts and feelings 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
10. I am able to see my thoughts as separate 
from who I am 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
11. I can readily take a step back from my 
thoughts and observe them 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
12. I have no difficulty realizing that 
thoughts are simply passing events in my 
mind that do not necessarily reflect reality 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
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 Disagree  Disagree 
to some 
extent 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree to 
some 
extent 
Agree 
 
13. I am usually aware of my thoughts 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I find it easy to shift my attention from 
one thing to another 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
15. I am often aware of the way my mind 
works 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I usually try to control or stop my 
thoughts even when they are upsetting 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
17. I can be aware of my mind as separate 
from the thoughts that it has 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
18. I am often aware of how events around 
me influence my thinking 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
19. I often let my thoughts roam freely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. I try and control my thoughts most of the 
time 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
21. I am not usually preoccupied with 
controlling my thoughts 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
22. I can concentrate on my work even if I’m 
worried about something 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reproduced with permission from:  
Nassif, Y. (2009). Test of metacognitive therapy and technique in posttraumatic disorder 
(PTSD). University of Manchester: Unpublished Doctoral Thesis. 
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Scoring key 
 
 
Detachment/ Observing self: 6, 9, 10, 11 and 17 
 
Meta-awareness: 3, 13, and 15 
 
Thought Control: 16, 19*, 20, 21* 
 
Attention flexibility& suspension of conceptual processing: 2, 4, 5, 14, and 22 
 
Cognitive de-centering: 1, 7, 8, 12, and 18 
 
 
 
 
 
*reverse score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reproduced with permission from: 
Nassif, Y. (2009). Test of metacognitive therapy and technique in posttraumatic disorder 
(PTSD). University of Manchester: Unpublished Doctoral Thesis. 
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The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. 
 
In order to protect copyright this measure has not been electronically included in the thesis. 
A loose copy is available with the hardbound version of the thesis. 
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Intrusions Record  
 
 
Please indicate how many mental intrusions (thoughts or memories 
about your event) you have experienced while listening to your 
narrative? (Please record a number) 
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Self-attention Rating (Wells, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3          -2          -1         0                  +1               +2                +3 
      
 
Entirely                                                Equal                                                  Entirely 
externally                                            amounts                                         self-focused 
focused 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wells, A. (2009). Metacognitive Therapy for Anxiety and Depression. New York: Guilford 
Press.  
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MANIPULATION CHECK 
 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate how well you were able to engage with the technique? 
 
 
Not at all                                                                                                       Very much 
     
   0     10%     20%     30%     40%     50%     60%     70%     80%     90%     100% 
 
 
 
How many times did you practice the technique for homework? 
 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
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H A K H B F D E R U Y P O S Q L K J I J 
N S Q E T H J N B V M O I S A Q L K I P 
D Z X H G R T Y H B A K J C X M L I T Y 
W D F R H Y S D J Z G E K I M N F T G Q 
Y A D F H Y U I J N D C S Q O L J B D Q 
I E F Q T Y K M N V A S Q E R U Y I O K 
B H J H E R T G S A H J K L I U B F A Q 
W K H G T E F S N D O R G S Q K V N Z I 
A M H F E R T S D A L K V B F Q R I U X 
Q G H U D E B M B A Q O E E F G O C D P 
H E V U V Y I R K X D F X J Z T B M G Z 
L H L G D H O F H I U D D N S G G G F D 
O F U D E G E G N N Z O E G W F E F C R 
T G Y E I E D H G G X E R T O D F R V I 
I E Y R U F C B D F M I F V U K R Y B M 
G X T M J R F N V D H N T C H I U U N N 
E Q V C G B N J F C T H G D G M J N Y G 
T J B Q L N H X R E E Y Y S R N M G Q F 
R D N O P M U C G R C U B K E B X Z S Q 
H U G K O I J S H U G C H U D S A W D O 
U M D H A J K E E J U D J J C Z L F F K 
J O A E Z Z I D U I O B U T V I O H O R 
D S Z V X A L F J O K E K G F Y P Q K F 
S I I S F S K W N P M E I H M R V O J I 
F N O K R D J P I L G F L G J E X L Y L 
V F K G E F A L A O Q P O D L K W M N S 
P Z T T C E R F V B H Z Q M O K J K G V 
L E E H B S Q U H G R B V I N M A I R G 
K A C A L J H G R F V S W U I K Q X E Y 
J K D M S X A J R Q A S U J G F O M Y J 
H W N L S D Q J Y U K N F T Y U K F J G 
A N B H G C E T N J U G S L Y N F Q X R 
G I H S E G T O P M H B Q C F E R T S L 
H S F T E N J U I S C V B G B T R U K X 
U K D R B G Q U J F B C E O U Z A P Q G 
Y E G F D T Y U K L O B C A Q E W T U P 
 
Attention Filler Task 
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8 5 4 5 2 6 8 9 2 0 1 4 5 7 8 5 1 5 1 
0 6 9 5 0 7 0 6 4 2 3 0 1 8 5 2 1 4 6 
2 9 4 8 5 0 2 9 3 0 5 6 0 5 8 9 9 0 9 
4 0 5 2 9 8 6 8 7 0 4 5 7 1 3 4 6 9 7 
6 2 8 0 6 9 8 5 7 4 5 0 2 3 6 4 5 4 5 
0 1 9 5 9 8 5 2 0 1 2 0 3 6 0 6 8 2 2 
3 4 0 6 6 5 3 4 7 8 2 6 4 1 1 8 2 3 5 
2 7 4 0 9 0 5 8 7 1 2 6 4 3 4 9 5 6 8 
5 5 6 3 5 0 4 6 0 2 3 1 8 9 5 2 6 5 1 
7 6 0 2 2 5 6 8 4 0 2 3 5 9 9 1 9 8 0 
0 3 2 8 1 7 5 1 6 9 2 0 2 0 6 0 7 2 2 
3 0 3 5 6 0 7 8 5 0 2 3 6 9 2 3 1 0 5 
6 2 0 4 3 6 0 3 2 4 4 6 0 0 3 5 0 7 4 
4 5 6 6 0 5 5 5 0 5 5 3 4 8 0 4 3 4 7 
9 8 9 0 2 6 8 6 8 2 2 0 6 7 7 7 0 5 6 
5 5 6 2 5 2 9 9 9 1 6 2 9 5 5 9 4 3 0 
0 4 7 1 8 4 6 8 5 0 0 5 2 6 6 3 8 0 3 
6 1 5 3 9 8 0 7 0 2 2 8 1 2 3 2 0 9 2 
5 0 4 2 2 0 2 6 6 5 4 1 0 0 2 0 5 0 4 
2 3 1 9 3 3 4 0 9 9 6 7 2 1 4 5 9 5 8 
6 6 2 5 0 6 8 2 8 0 2 5 3 4 5 4 7 1 7 
4 9 3 0 1 9 7 5 0 7 5 2 9 2 0 6 6 4 5 
9 0 0 8 5 7 5 2 7 6 4 0 8 3 1 1 0 8 2 
0 2 6 0 4 5 3 4 0 2 0 3 5 6 2 7 5 5 0 
2 1 5 7 7 4 0 8 6 4 7 4 7 4 0 3 6 7 4 
5 4 9 2 3 0 2 9 5 3 6 0 5 9 2 5 1 4 6 
7 5 8 6 5 4 6 2 8 9 0 1 2 6 9 9 0 6 9 
0 2 2 4 0 3 2 6 0 5 8 9 7 0 6 0 8 3 0 
1 3 3 5 6 5 8 9 2 4 0 2 5 6 4 4 0 0 8 
3 6 0 1 7 5 6 2 6 5 7 0 3 8 7 1 0 5 4 
2 9 4 5 8 0 4 9 0 6 2 3 7 1 9 0 5 8 6 
0 7 1 7 8 2 0 3 6 0 9 0 5 1 2 8 4 7 5 
2 5 3 8 5 0 6 8 1 9 0 8 4 7 0 6 4 6 8 
6 0 8 7 5 0 2 3 6 0 9 4 0 2 5 7 5 7 2 
9 1 3 6 5 8 9 7 5 2 1 0 2 0 7 7 9 6 5 
2 9 0 1 7 5 3 7 8 6 2 4 0 1 5 6 2 3 1 
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Descriptive Statistics by Group for the other variables  
 
Group Variable Mean SD Range 
 
 
ATT 
group 
N=29 
 
IES total score Time 1 
IES total score time 2 
Intrusions subscale (IES) Time 1 
Intrusions subscale (IES)  Time 2 
Avoidance subscale (IES)  Time 1 
Avoidance subscale (IES)  Time 2 
Positive Affect (PANAS) Time 1 
Positive Affect (PANAS) Time 1 
DMQ Total score Time 1 
DMQ Total score Time 2 
DMQ Detachment Time 1 
DMQ Detachment Time 2 
DMQ Meta-awareness Time 1  
DMQ Meta-awareness Time 1 
DMQ Thought Control Time 1 
DMQ Thought Control Time 2 
DMQ Cognitive Decentering Time 1  
DMQ Cognitive Decentering Time 1 
 
 
32.83 
25.10 
14.48 
10.41 
18.21 
14.79 
21.79 
26.65 
71.83 
76.48 
15.76 
17.72 
12.03 
12.10 
11.17 
10.34 
19.07 
21.17 
 
18.17 
15.16 
10.19 
7.85 
10.08 
9,82 
6.99 
7.99 
9.33 
7.14 
4.53 
3.56 
2.20 
2.04 
3.06 
2.98 
3.16 
2.27 
 
7-71 
3-59 
1-35 
2-33 
3-36 
1-36 
12-39 
13-43 
45-88 
62-91 
7-24 
9=25 
5-15 
7-17 
5-17 
5-16 
11-24 
15-24 
 
 
Control 
group 
N=31 
 
IES total score Time 1 
IES total score time 2 
Intrusions subscale (IES) Time 1 
Intrusions subscale (IES)  Time 2 
Avoidance subscale (IES)  Time 1 
Avoidance subscale (IES)  Time 2 
Positive Affect (PANAS) Time 1 
Positive Affect (PANAS) Time 1 
DMQ Total score Time 1 
DMQ Total score Time 2 
DMQ Detachment Time 1 
DMQ Detachment Time 2 
DMQ Meta-awareness Time 1  
DMQ Meta-awareness Time 1 
DMQ Thought Control Time 1 
DMQ Thought Control Time 2 
DMQ Cognitive Decentering Time 1  
DMQ Cognitive Decentering Time 1 
 
 
 
 
 
25.10 
25.71 
13.10 
11.97 
14.77 
13.74 
20.48 
19.90 
69.23 
69.84 
13.39 
14.03 
12.58 
12.13 
11.74 
11.84 
18.45 
18.13 
 
 
 
 
 
15.16 
10.66 
6.77 
5.96 
8.38 
7.36 
7.66 
7.63 
11.65 
9.97 
4.20 
4.10 
1.59 
2.19 
2.68 
2.49 
3.35 
2.96 
 
3-59 
7-47 
1-24 
3-25 
2-33 
0-31 
10-40 
10-40 
48-107 
50-98 
5-25 
5-24 
8-15 
6-15 
5-18 
6-16 
9-25 
10-23 
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Adapted from: Wells, A. (2009). Metacognitive Therapy for Anxiety and Depression. 
New York: Guilford Press.  
 
PTSD symptoms are a normal part of adaptation to a traumatic 
experience.  
 
Intrusive thoughts, arousal responses, flash backs, nightmares and startle 
responses are normal and necessary after trauma. They are a sign that you are 
attempting to process the trauma and adjust to the event in a way that 
enhances future coping. However some coping strategies and thinking styles 
have an effect of preventing this process from reaching completion because 
they maintain a sense of threat. Specifically worrying about danger in the 
future, repeatedly going back over the trauma in your mind and trying to 
suppress thoughts and avoid them.  
 
 
Healing metaphor – recovery does not require the excessive use of 
current strategies.  
 
Overcoming a psychological injury caused by trauma is very much like 
overcoming a physical injury such as a cut to the skin.  If you think of a 
physical injury the body has its own way of healing an injury over time.  
But what would happen if you tried to make the injury heal, say by picking at 
the scar and repeatedly cleaning the wound? How quickly would it heal? 
 
Trauma symptoms are like this. Overtime the mind can heal itself and this 
often occurs. However, just like a flesh wound, if you interfere with the 
healing process it can take longer and symptoms can persist. You are 
interfering in the healing process by engaging in worry and rumination, by 
avoiding thoughts, and by keeping attention focused on threat.  
These processes can be difficult to stop initially. ATT will help you to 
develop a new relationship with thoughts and develop flexibility in your 
thinking that will enable the healing process to resume.  
  
Attention Training:  
 
Attention training technique is a metacognitive treatment technique which 
aims to stop self-focused attention, can make it easier to break free of old and 
unhelpful thinking patterns and facilitate healthy processing of the trauma. 
ATT works by increasing your level of mental flexibility. It strengthens and 
restores internal mental control mechanisms and to understand this it can be 
likened to mental fitness training. We all know that being physically fit helps 
build resistance to disease and helps fight infection. If we are flexible in the 
way that we think this level of mental fitness helps recovery from 
psychological distress. 
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The aim of the technique it not to distract you from upsetting thoughts or 
feelings. In fact these are likely to occur as you practice. You must not try to 
stop them. If you have negative thoughts or feeling treat them as inner –
noises. The aim is to continue to follow the procedure whilst allowing these 
inner experiences to take care of themselves. You can simply think of these 
experiences as passing events in your mind and body. 
 
I would like to practice this technique twice, once in the morning and in the 
evening. If possible ban rumination (going over the trauma), worry, and threat 
monitoring. These are all examples of picking the scar.  
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1. Are PTSD symptoms normal? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. What does recovery from PTSD require you to do? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What can you do to help change these thinking patterns and let these 
thoughts take care of themselves? 
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Appendix G: Participant Information Sheet 
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School of Psychological Sciences 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Title of project:  A study of the effects of attentional training technique (ATT) on intrusive 
thoughts and emotions following a stressful life event. 
 
Introduction:   People usually experience distressing events (e.g. being a victim of crime) 
over the course of their life time. Intrusive thoughts after these events are common and 
are considered to be part of a normal emotional process. These thoughts can become 
problematic when people respond to them by changing their pattern of attention or 
thinking. The present study sets out to look at whether practicing specific attention 
exercises will help to alleviate intrusive thoughts and discomfort. 
 
What will I be asked to do if I take part?   The first part of this study involves responding 
via email to the questions: Has a stressful event happened to you, such as a crime or car 
accident or a threat to your personal safety? Do you get intrusive thoughts about it that 
you find uncomfortable?”  You will be asked to rate your level of discomfort and if 
considered eligible for the study invited to take part in the experiment. This study involves 
two sessions which will take place on two separate days. Each which will be arranged by 
the researcher. You will be asked to complete three short questionnaires. You will be 
asked questions that will assess: your emotions (e.g. fear), the impact of the distressing 
event (e.g. I tried not to think about it), the level of awareness that you have of your own 
thoughts (e.g. I can let go of my thoughts even if I am worried) and your ability not to 
engage with them when you are stressed (e.g. I can let go of my thoughts even if I am 
worried).  Here, and only if you agree, you will be asked to report an unpleasant 
experience that happened to you. This will be recorded on a tape and will be destroyed at 
the end of the experiment. You will be randomly allocated to one of two groups. 
Depending on the group, you will be given an attention task to complete. This may involve 
listening to a cd, or completing letter and number finding tasks. You will also be asked to 
complete a computer task. You may also be given a short home-work task to complete. 
On the second session you will repeat the task as in the first session, and then you will 
listen to your narrative that was recorded in the previous session. You will be asked to 
complete the same questionnaires and ratings scales as in the first session. You will also 
be asked to complete the computer task again. You will receive course credits (if eligible) 
or £10 as compensation for you time.  
 
Will my data be confidential?   All information collected as part of this study will be 
treated in the strictest of confidence. Personal details and responses will be kept on a 
separate database. Only the researcher and supervisor will have access to it. The results 
of the study will be published in articles in psychology journals so that other psychologists 
can read about the research. It will not be possible to identify who you are from any 
results.  
 
Do I have to take part?   Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. If you 
decide to take part and then later change your mind, either before you start the study, 
during it or afterwards, you can withdraw without giving reasons, and if you wish your data 
will be destroyed. 
 
Where can I obtain further information if I need it?   
 If you have any questions about the study please contact Sheila Callinan by email at 
sheila.callinan@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk or the study supervisor Professor Adrian 
Wells at Adrian.Wells@manchester.ac.uk  
 
This project has been approved by the 
School of Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee 
Project no 
658/07P 
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Appendix H: Consent Form 
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Project no 658/07P 
 
School of Psychological Sciences 
 
Consent form 
 
Title of Project: A study of the effects of attentional training technique (ATT) on 
intrusive thoughts and emotions following a stressful life event. 
  
 
The participant should complete the following part of this sheet him/herself 
              
1.  Have you read the Participant Information Sheet? YES/NO 
Initials:…… 
2.  Have you received enough information about the study? YES/NO 
Initials:…… 
3.  Do you consent to be audio taped as detailed  
     in the Participant Information Sheet? 
YES/NO 
Initials:…… 
4.  Do you understand that you do not need to take part in the study and if  
     you do enter you are free to withdraw:- 
 *  at any time 
 *  without having to give a reason for withdrawing 
 *  and without detriment to you? 
YES/NO 
Initials:…… 
 
5.  Do you agree to take part in this study? YES/NO 
Initials:……
. 
 
Name of participant: ……….…..……..…… Signed: ................................ Date: .................. 
Name of researcher: Sheila Callinan….….Signed: ................................ Date: .................. 
 
Do you consent for the audio tapes to be retained and used for future studies? YES/NO 
Initials:…… 
 
Name of participant: ……….…..……..…… Signed: ................................ Date: .................. 
Name of researcher: Sheila Callinan …….Signed: ................................ Date: .................. 
 
This project has been approved by the 
School of Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee 
Project no 
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Appendix I: Type of Stressor 
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Stressful life events reported (N = 60) 
 
 
Type of Stressor 
 
Reported Stressors N 
 
Death of close 
family member or 
friend 
 
Death of father from cancer, death of mother from 
substance misuse, death of grandmother from natural 
causes, death of close friend from suicide, death of best 
friend‟s mother, death of friend from illness 
 
6 
 
Sexual Assault 
 
Sexual assault by stranger, sexual assault by family 
friend, rape 
 
5 
 
Physical Assault  
 
Domestic violence, physical assault by gang, physical 
assault at home, being mugged, being stalked and 
threatened, held at knife point and mugged 
 
12 
  
Motor Accident 
 
Car accident while driving or as a passenger 
 
12 
 
Initial shock of 
discovering illness 
to self or loved one 
 
Diagnosis and treatment of cancer, burst own ear drum 
with cotton bud, blood sugars dangerously high 
(diabetic), back operation, mother nearly died from 
illness on holiday 
 
5 
 
Survived 
accident/incident 
to self or other 
 
Surf accident, witnessed stabbing, witnessed violence at 
a house party, mother‟s stalker attempted to break into 
house, attempted break in by gang of youths, witnessing 
loved pet cat dying, exam failure 
 
11 
 
Stressful period in 
past (which ended) 
that brought 
extreme changes 
 
Family conflict, father sent to prison, relationship 
breakdown, emotionally abusive father, finding out 
identity of sister‟s father, parents‟ divorce, sister ran 
away 
 
9 
. 
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Appendix J: Poster for Recruitment 
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Volunteers Needed for an Attention 
Training Study 
Participants can earn up to 12 credits (if 
eligible) or £10 
 
Following a brief initial screening, participants are 
needed for an attention training experiment. This will 
take place on two separate days. The first session will 
take 1 hour and the second session will also take 1 
hour. Both sessions are essential for the experiment.  
 
You may be asked to practice a short exercise twice 
for homework. 
 
Incentive: You will be paid £10 for doing both 
sessions or receive 12 course credits (6 per session). 
 
Interested in taking part? Please contact Sheila at 
sheila.callinan@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk 
 
 
This study is being carried out by Sheila Callinan as part of her 
ClinPsyD research, under the supervision of Professor Adrian Wells, 
from the School of Psychological Sciences.  
 
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE 
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
 
 
Codename: 
658/07P 
